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1 Introduction
A number of growth models treat private firms’ intentional investments in R&D as the
driver of long-run growth and welfare (e.g., Romer, 1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992,
Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995) . These models assume that there are knowledge
spillovers in R&D process and R&D builds on a pool of knowledge. In this sense these
growth models abstract from the role of knowledge (patent) licensing and from the
details about the exchange of knowledge in the economy. Nevertheless, licensing and
establishing consortia for exchanging patents is common in high-tech industries (e.g.,
Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002) .1 Moreover, it has been argued extensively that exchanging
patents plays a significant role for innovation in these industries (e.g., Grindley and
Teece, 1997, Shapiro, 2001, Clark et al., 2000).2 For instance, yet at the beginning of
the previous century the major players in the Radio, Television and Communication
Equipment industry in the United States experienced difficulties in innovating and
advancing their products until the establishment of a patent consortium, RCA Cor-
poration. Meanwhile, high-tech industries are the top private R&D performers and
there is a large body of anecdotal and rigorous empirical evidence that they make
a significant contribution to economic growth (e.g., Helpman, 1998, Jorgenson et al.,
2005).
In this paper I present an endogenous growth model where high-tech firms engage
in intra-firm (or in-house) R&D and that drives long-run growth. High-tech firms
have exclusive rights to the type of their product. In a high-tech firm the innovation
enhances firm/product-specific knowledge which reduces the firm’s marginal costs or
increases the quality of its product. High-tech firms finance their R&D expenditures
from operating profits. They set prices and compete strategically in their output
market. My point of departure is that I model knowledge (patent) licensing among
high-tech firms. The knowledge generated in a high-tech firm cannot be used for free,
but it can be licensed. Given that each high-tech firm produces a distinct type of
good, for a high-tech firm the knowledge of other high-tech firms is complementary
to its own. If a high-tech firm licenses the knowledge of another it can combine that
knowledge with its own and improve its in-house R&D process since the latter builds
on the knowledge that the firm possesses.
In such a setup I show how market concentration, intensity of competition as mea-
1In terms of 2-digit ISIC (Rev. 3), according to OECD STAN data high-tech industries as measured
by R&D intensity are, for example, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 64 and 72.
2Currently, there are virtually no comprehensive data for measuring the size of the market for patents
and other types of intellectual property. According to some estimates (Robbins, 2009) in the US in 2002
corporate domestic income from licensing patents and trade secrets was $50 billion or approximately
25 percent of total private R&D expenditure. Moreover, it was expected to grown at more than 10
percent annual rate.
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sured by the elasticity of substitution between high-tech goods, and type of competi-
tion (Cournot or Bertrand) can matter for innovation in the high-tech industry and
aggregate performance. I contrast the inference from this setup to the inference from
setups where there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms and/or there
are knowledge spillovers (i.e., firms obtain others’ knowledge for free). Further, it is
often conjectured that the use of high-tech goods such as phones and PCs entails posi-
tive externalities, which lower the transaction costs and increase the efficiency of users
(e.g., Leff, 1984). I assess how innovation in the high-tech industry and aggregate
performance depend on the magnitude of such externalities.
I show that when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms in
the form of licensing or spillovers, innovation in the high-tech industry and economic
growth increase with the number of high-tech firms. The driver behind this result are
the relative price distortions which are due to price setting by high-tech firms. This
distortion adversely affects the demand for high-tech goods. Given that high-tech firms
interact strategically in the output market a higher number of firms implies lower mark-
ups and lower distortion. This increases the demand for high-tech goods and implies
higher output and investments in R&D in the high-tech industry.3 However, if there is
no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms, then increasing the number of firms
has two effects on innovation in the high-tech industry. One is the lower distortion,
which is positive. Another is negative and is due to lower amount of R&D inputs
available per high-tech firm. When the number of high-tech firms is relatively low the
positive effect dominates, whereas for a relatively high number of firms the negative
effect dominates. This negative effect when there is knowledge exchange among high-
tech firms is offset by more complementary knowledge made available by high-tech
firms.
I further show that in all the setups that I consider, innovation in the high-tech
industry and economic growth increase with the intensity of competition. Tougher
competition, which is defined as the type of competition with lower mark-ups (Bertrand
vs. Cournot; Sutton, 1991), also implies more innovation in the high-tech industry
and higher growth. These results are in line with the results of Smulders and van de
Klundert (1995) and van de Klundert and Smulders (1997), and hold because both more
intensive and tougher competition reduce mark-ups and the relative price distortions.4
The availability of complementary knowledge also motivates innovation in the high-
tech industry. High-tech firms innovate more and the economy grows at a higher rate if
3O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller (2004) have a similar result in a Schumpeterian growth model. Vives
(2008) shows that such a result can also hold in partial equilibrium for various types of demand
functions.
4The positive relation between innovation and different types of competitive pressure is consistent with
the empirical findings of, for example, Blundell et al. (1999) and Nickell (1996).
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there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms than if there is no exchange.
This is because R&D builds on a bigger pool of knowledge if there is an exchange of
knowledge. Moreover, if there is no knowledge exchange high-tech firms might not
innovate at all if there are many of them in the market. The driver behind this result
is the scarcity of R&D inputs available per high-tech firm if there are many such firms.
High-tech firms also innovate more and the economy grows at a higher rate when there
is knowledge licensing compared to the case when there are knowledge spillovers among
high-tech firms.
The higher magnitude of positive externalities from the use of high-tech goods
implies lower innovation in the high-tech industry. Nevertheless, economic growth
increases with the magnitude of these externalities. Innovation declines because the
higher magnitude of positive extenralities brings no additional internalized benefit to
high-tech firms and in equilibrium it implies a higher rate of interest. In turn, eco-
nomic growth increases since the higher magnitude of externalities implies a higher
contribution of innovation in the high-tech industry to growth.
Finally, I endogenize the number of high-tech firms assuming cost-free entry. Inno-
vation in the high-tech industry and economic growth are the lowest in case when there
is no exchange of knowledge among these firms. In turn, innovation in the high-tech
industry and economic growth are the highest in case when there is knowledge licensing
among these firms. This happens, however, at the expense of the number of high-tech
firms (or the variety of high-tech goods.) In other words, the number of high-tech firms
is the lowest in case when there is knowledge licensing and the highest in case there is
no exchange of knowledge.
Increasing the intensity and/or toughness of competition reduces the number of
firms. When there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms this has no
effect, however, on allocations, innovation in the high-tech industry, and economic
growth. Meanwhile, allocations change and innovation and economic growth tend to
increase with the intensity and toughness of competition if there is no exchange of
knowledge among high-tech firms.
This paper is related to the endogenous growth literature (e.g., Romer, 1990, Aghion
and Howitt, 1992, Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995) where the positive growth of
the economy on a balanced growth path is a result of technological and preference fac-
tors. In particular, it is related to studies which in an endogenous growth framework
suggest how the aggregate performance can be affected by imperfect competition in an
industry where the firms engage in in-house R&D (e.g., van de Klundert and Smul-
ders, 1997). It contributes to these streams of studies while showing how knowledge
licensing in such an industry can affect innovation in that industry and the aggregate
performance. It also contributes while showing how the positive externalities from the
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use of the goods of such an industry can affect the decentralized equilibrium outcomes.
Further, there is a number of papers that model knowledge (patent) and technology
licensing in standard Schumpeterian growth framework and show how patent policy and
international technology licensing can affect innovation and growth (e.g., O’Donoghue
and Zweimu¨ller, 2004, Yang and Maskus, 2001, Tanaka et al., 2007). In these papers
licensing happens between incumbents and entrants given that in standard Schum-
peterian growth framework incumbents have no incentives to innovate. Licensing does
not explicitly aid R&D process and licenses are essentially permits for production. In
such a framework in order to maintain incentives for licensing, these papers assume
that either licensors and licensees (incumbents and entrants) collude in the product
market or licensees can access larger market (e.g., one of the countries bans FDI). The
share in collective profits and licensing fees compensate incumbents’ loss of the prod-
uct market (and costs of technology transfer) and are either exogenous or exogenously
determined by patent policy. In contrast, this paper has a non-tournament framework
where incumbents innovate because that allows stealing market share and licensing
happens among incumbents. Firms have incentive to license knowledge from other
firms because that aids their R&D process. Further, license fees are determined by the
structure of the market for knowledge, which can depend on patent policy, and supply
and demand conditions. To that end, the framework and analysis of this paper can be
thought to be complementary.
There is also a large body of firm- and industry-level studies that analyze the impli-
cations of patent licensing, patent consortia or pools, and knowledge exchange amongy
firms on innovation and market conduct (e.g., Gallini, 1984, Gallini and Winter, 1985,
Shapiro, 1985, Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Bessen and Maskin, 2009). This paper ana-
lyzes such issues at the aggregate level in a dynamic general equilibrium framework
which assumes an undistorted market for knowledge/patents. This assumption allows
to have tractable inference and can be justified to the extent that this paper aims to
address long-run issues, for example. In turn, the dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work allows to endogenize the growth rate of the economy and the effect of knowledge
licensing on, for example, interest rate which affects the incentives to perform R&D.
Licensing in this paper ceteris paribus motivates R&D. This, in turn, implies higher
growth rate and higher rate of interest which reduces the incentives to perform R&D.
The next section offers the model. Section 3 analyzes the features of dynamic
equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical and infinitely lived households of
mass one. The representative household is endowed with a fixed amount of labor (L). It
inelastically supplies its labor to firms which produce final goods and to high-tech firms.
The household has a standard CIES utility function with an inter-temporal substitution
parameter 1
θ
and discounts the future streams of utility with rate ρ (θ, ρ > 0). The
utility gains are from the consumption of amount C of final goods. The lifetime utility
of the household is
U =
+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt. (1)
The household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint,
A˙ = rA+ wL− C, (2)
where A are the household’s asset holdings [A (0) > 0], r and w are the market returns
on its asset holdings and labor supply.
The optimal rule that follows from the household’s optimal problem is the standard
Euler equation,
C˙
C
=
1
θ
(r − ρ) . (3)
This, together with budget constraint (2), describes the paths of the household’s con-
sumption and assets.
Final Goods
Final goods are homogeneous, Y . The household’s demand for final goods is served by
a representative producer. The production of final goods requires labor and X, which is
a Dixit-Stiglitz composite of high-tech goods {xi}Ni=1 with an elasticity of substitution
ε.
Ceteris paribus the increasing demand of X creates externalities in final goods
production, which are measured by X˜. These externalities increase the productivity
of the final goods producers. For example, these externalities stand for network effects
that stem from using high-tech goods such as PCs and phones.
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The production of the final goods has a Cobb-Douglas technology and is given by
Y = X˜XσL1−σY , (4)
X =
(
N∑
i=1
x
ε−1
ε
i
) ε
ε−1
, (5)
1 > σ > 0, ε > 1,
where LY is the share of the labor force employed in final goods production.
For ease of exposition, the problem of the representative final goods producer is
divided into two steps. In the first step the representative producer decides on the
optimal combination of LY and X in Y and in the second step it decides on the
optimal amounts of high-tech goods x in X.
Therefore, in the first step the representative producer solves the following problem.
max
LY ,X
{Y − wLY − PXX}
s.t.
(4),
where PX is the ”price” (private marginal value) of X and Y is the numeraire. The
optimal rules that follow from this problem describe the final goods producer’s demand
for labor and the optimal amount of X for the production of Y ,
[LY ] : wLY = (1− σ)Y, (6)
[X] : PXX = σY. (7)
In the second step the producer solves
max
{xi}Ni=1
{
PXX −
N∑
i=1
pxixi
}
,
s.t.
(5),
where px is the price of x. This implies that the demand for a high-tech good is
[xj] : xj = X
(
PX
pxj
)ε
. (8)
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From this expression follow two equilibrium conditions,
PXX =
N∑
i=1
pxixi, (9)
PX =
(
N∑
i=1
p1−εxi
) 1
1−ε
, (10)
where the first means that there is no waste and the second implies that PX is an index
of px.
Further, I assume that the measure of externalities X˜ is given by
X˜ = Xµ,
where µ measures the strength of these externalities (1− σ > µ ≥ 0).5
High-tech Goods
At any time t there are N(t) producers in the high-tech industry.6
Production
Each high-tech firm owns a design (blueprint) of distinct high-tech good x, which it
produces. The production of a high-tech good requires labor input Lx. The production
function of a high-tech good x is
x = λLx, (11)
where λmeasures the producer’s knowledge of production process or quality of the high-
tech good. This knowledge is firm/product-specific since each high-tech firm produces
a distinct good.
High-tech firms are price setters in their output market and discount their future
profit streams pi with the market interest rate r. I assume that high-tech firms cannot
collude in the output market.
Knowledge Accumulation
High-tech firms can engage in R&D for accumulating knowledge and increasing λ. This
can be interpreted as a process innovation that increases productivity (the firms are
able to produce more of x), or as a quality upgrade (the firms are able to produce the
5It is necessary to have 1− σ > µ in order for the production function of final goods (4) to be concave
in X in the Social Planner’s problem.
6In order to avoid complications arising from integer constraints I allow N to be real number.
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same amount of higher quality x). Knowledge is non-rival so that potentially it can be
used at the same time in multiple places/firms.
In this section I offer three different settings of knowledge accumulation/R&D pro-
cess. The differences stem from whether and how knowledge is exchanged among
high-tech firms.7,8
Hereafter, when appropriate for ease of exposition I describe the properties of the
high-tech industry while taking as an example high-tech firm j, j ∈ (1, N ]. In order to
improve its knowledge λj the firm needs to hire researchers/labor Lrj . Researchers use
the current knowledge of the firm in order to create better knowledge.
Knowledge Licensing: This is the benchmark setup (S.1). Knowledge in this setup
can be licensed. In the market for knowledge the licensors (or the suppliers of knowl-
edge) have the bargaining power in the sense that they can make a ‘take it or leave it’
offer.
The benefit from licensing knowledge is that it can be used in the in-house R&D
process. If high-tech firm j decides to license knowledge from other high-tech firms, its
researchers combine that knowledge with the knowledge available in the firm in order
to produce new knowledge. The knowledge available in the firm is an essential input
in the knowledge accumulation process of the firm. Moreover, it is the only essential
input. This implies that the high-tech firm does not need to acquire knowledge from
other firms in order to advance its own. However, it needs to have its knowledge for
building on it. This is in line with that high-tech firms produce distinct goods.9,10
The knowledge accumulation/R&D process is given by
λ˙j = ξ
[
N∑
i=1
(ui,jλi)
α
]
λ1−αj Lrj , (12)
ξ > 0, 1 > α > 0,
where ξ is an exogenous efficiency level, ui,j is the share of knowledge of firm i (λi)
that firm j licenses, and uj,j ≡ 1.11
It can be shown that in (12) the elasticity of substitution between the different
types of knowledge that the high-tech firm licenses is equal to 1
1−α . It can also be
shown that the elasticity of substitution between the high-tech firm’s knowledge and
7The functional forms of the knowledge accumulation processes are selected so that they ensure a
balanced growth path.
8In these setups each high-tech firm engages in in-house R&D and there is no R&D cooperation.
Appendix E.1 analyzes the case when firms cooperate in R&D and compete in the product market.
9One way to think about this setup is that high-tech firms can use their knowledge (patents) and build
around others’ knowledge.
10I assume that license contracts do not allow sub-licensing.
11Appendix E.2 incorporates knowledge spillovers and depreciation in this R&D process.
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any knowledge that it licenses is lower than 1
1−α (see Appendix T.1). This restates the
importance of the firm’s knowledge for its knowledge accumulation process.
In this knowledge accumulation process because of summation the productivity
of researchers increases linearly with knowledge licensed from an additional high-tech
firm. Such a formulation can be justified if there are significant complementarities
among the knowledge of high-tech firms.12 Further, it might seem brave to assume
that knowledge accumulation in a single firm can have non-decreasing returns.13 This
assumption allows to focus on the effect of market structure of the high-tech industry
on innovation in that industry through competitive pressure. It can be relaxed setting
uj,j ≡ 0 in square brackets in (12). In such a case in this model knowledge licensing
(or exchange of knowledge) is a necessary condition to ensure non-decreasing returns
to knowledge accumulation and positive growth in the long-run (Appendix E.3 offers
the main properties of the model if uj,j ≡ 0). The knowledge accumulation process
(12) can also be viewed as a simplification leading to tractable results. It ensures that
there exists a balanced growth path, for example.
One way to think about this setup is that each high-tech firm can license the
patented knowledge of other firms in order to generate its patented knowledge that
helps to improve its production or output. The firm does not use the knowledge that it
licensed directly in the production of its high-tech good because that knowledge needs
to be combined with its own knowledge, and that requires investments in terms of hiring
researchers (and time). The latter seems plausible for technologically sophisticated
(e.g., high-tech) goods.
Knowledge Spillovers: In this case (S.2) there are knowledge spillovers among high-
tech firms. In high-tech firm j the researchers combine the knowledge that spills over
from other high-tech firms with the knowledge available in the firm while generating
new knowledge. In order to maintain symmetry I assume also that the researchers do
not fully internalize the use of the current knowledge available in the firm and have
external benefits from it. Similar to the previous setup, this assumption allows to
focus on the effect of market structure of the high-tech industry on innovation through
competitive pressure.14
12Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) have a similar additive structure
for knowledge in the R&D process in the context of knowledge spillovers between countries. Peretto
(1998a) and Peretto (1998b) have a similar structure in the context of knowledge spillovers among
firms in an industry.
13In this respect, a high-tech firm can be a firm that started with tabulating machines and reached the
point of producing supercomputers and artificial intelligence systems (e.g., IBM).
14Appendix E.3 relaxes this assumption and offers the main properties of the model.
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The knowledge accumulation process is
λ˙j = ξΛ˜λ
1−α
j Lrj , (13)
where I assume that in equilibrium Λ˜ is given by
Λ˜ ≡
N∑
i=1
λαi .
15 (14)
An interpretation of this case is that there are knowledge externalities/spillovers
within high-tech firms and there is a market for knowledge where the potential licensees
have a right to make a ‘take it or leave it’ offer. The licensees under this assumption
receive the knowledge at no cost (i.e., there are knowledge spillovers) if the supply
of knowledge is not elastic. The supply is necessarily inelastic if licensors do not have
trade-offs and/or costs associated with licensing knowledge. It seems natural to assume
that once knowledge is created its supply entails virtually no costs. Meanwhile, there
would be no trade-offs if licensors do not take into account that the knowledge they
license is used for business stealing: the licensees use it in order to reduce their prices
and steal market share. I assume that licensors do not take into account this effect.
Such an assumption is not new to this line of literature. Many papers (e.g., van de
Klundert and Smulders, 1997) assume that the originators of knowledge spillovers (here,
high-tech firms) do not internalize the effect of spillovers (here, licensed knowledge) on
other’s knowledge accumulation and production processes. This assumption helps to
avoid complications in differential games arising from the dependence of the current
choice on the entire future (or history) of states.16 Further, in the frames of this model
this assumption is necessary in order to give such a market-based interpretation to
knowledge spillovers, which links this setup (S.2) with the previous one (S.1).
In this model, similar to λ, the design of a high-tech good can be interpreted
as knowledge/patent. In order to guarantee that high-tech firms have incentives to
innovate it needs to be assumed that (at least for sometime) the knowledge on the
design of high-tech goods does not spill over or cannot be used by other firms without
appropriate compensation. Any high-tech firm, nevertheless, could sell the design of
its high-tech good at market value: the discounted sum of profit streams earned selling
the high-tech good.17 Therefore, the market structure of knowledge on the production
15Peretto (1998a) and Peretto (1998b) model the knowledge accumulation process similar to (13) and
(14), though these papers assume that α = 1.
16In this model, under this assumption high-tech firms do not realize that the knowledge which they
accumulate enters the knowledge accumulation process of other high-tech firms and from the next
instance augments their rivals’ productivity. If they realized that, then by integrating over the (future)
changes of knowledge of their rivals they could track how their current investment in knowledge affects
the productivity and market share of their rivals in the future.
17This simply implies that the name of the high-tech firm does not matter.
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process or the quality of high-tech goods λ where the licensors have a right to make a
‘take it or leave it’ offer seems to be more appropriate in such a setup.
In this model λ can also be viewed as a patent on the production process or the
quality of the product. Such market-based interpretations are then appropriate if,
for example, there is strong enforcement of intellectual property rights and patent in-
fringements are detectable. Given the recent history of the high number of patent
infringement lawsuits in high-tech industries, both assumptions seem to be plausible.
Meanwhile, the existence of lawsuits can indicate that the market structure of knowl-
edge/patents where buyers have a right to make a ‘take it or leave it’ offer may not be
realistic.
No Exchange of Knowledge: In this case (S.3) there is no exchange of knowledge
among high-tech firms. Moreover, in the process of generation of new knowledge the
researchers do not fully internalize the use of previous knowledge available in the firm
and have external benefits from it.
The knowledge accumulation is given by
λ˙j = ξλ˜λ
1−α
j Lrj , (15)
where λ˜ stands for the external benefits and I assume that in equilibrium
λ˜ ≡ λαj .18 (16)
Clearly, in a symmetric equilibrium this case can also be interpreted as if there is an
exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms in terms of spillovers and these spillovers
are from average knowledge, i.e.,
λ˜ ≡
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
λi
)α
.
The spillovers from average knowledge, however, mask the existence of complemen-
tarity among the knowledge available in different firms. This is because the spillovers
from an additional firm might bring no additional benefit. Therefore, I prefer avoiding
this interpretation. In this respect, the knowledge accumulation process (15) and (16)
can be interpreted as if the exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms is banned (or
there is no appropriate institutional framework for it). It is clear that (12) and (13)
reduce to (15) if there is no knowledge exchange among high-tech firms [i.e., (12) and
(15) are equivalent if ui,j = 0 for any i 6= j and limiting case α = 0; (13) and (15) are
18van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) have a similar formulation for the knowledge accumulation
process.
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equivalent if λi = 0 for any i 6= j ].
Optimal Problem
The revenues of high-tech firm j are gathered from the supply of its high-tech good and
in the case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1) from the supply of its knowledge
(uj,iλj;∀i 6= j). The costs are the labor compensations and license fees in case when
there is knowledge licensing. The high-tech firm maximizes the present discounted
value V of its profit streams subject to (8), (11), and either (12), or (13), or (15).
Under Cournot competition, the high-tech firm chooses the supply of its product (i.e.,
Lxj) given the (inverse) demand for it. In contrast, under Bertrand competition the
firm chooses the price of its product (i.e., pxj) given the demand for it.
Formally, the problem of the high-tech firm is
max
Cournot: Lxj ,Lrj ,{uj,i,ui,j}Ni=1;(i 6=j)
Bertrand: pxj ,Lrj ,{uj,i,ui,j}Ni=1;(i 6=j)
Vj (t¯) =
+∞∫
t¯
pij (t) exp
[
−
t∫¯
t
r (s) ds
]
dt (17)
s.t.
(8), (11) and either (12), or (13), or (15),
where t¯ is the entry date and
pij = pxjxj − w
(
Lxj + Lrj
)
(18)
+
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλj (uj,iλj)−
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
pui,jλi (ui,jλi)
]
.
In profit function pij the term in square brackets stands for knowledge licensing, and
puj,iλj and pui,jλi are the prices of uj,iλj and ui,jλi.
The solution of the optimal problem implies that the supply of high-tech good xj
and the demand for labor for knowledge accumulation are
[
Lxj
]
: w = λjpxj
(
1− 1
ej
)
, (19)
[
Lrj
]
: w = qλj
λ˙j
Lrj
, (20)
where ej is the elasticity of substitution between high-tech goods perceived by the
high-tech firm and qλj is the shadow value of knowledge accumulation.
The perceived elasticity of substitution (ej) varies with competition type. It can
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be shown that under Bertrand competition
eBRj ≡ ej = ε−
(ε− 1) p1−εxjN∑
i=1
p1−εxi
 , (21)
and under Cournot competition
eCRj ≡ ej = ε
1 +
(ε− 1) x
ε−1
ε
j
N∑
i=1
x
ε−1
ε
i


−1
. (22)
The terms in square brackets in (21) and (22) measure the impact of other high-tech
firms on the demand of high-tech firm j. In other words, they measure the extent
of strategic interactions among high-tech firms. Moreover, these terms indicate the
difference between the perceived elasticity of substitution (e) and the actual elasticity
of substitution (ε). Therefore, they indicate some of the distortions in the economy
which stem from imperfect competition with a finite number of high-tech firms. In a
symmetric equilibrium, when the number of firms increases, these distortions tend to
zero since the terms in square brackets tend to zero.
In case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1) the returns on knowledge accumu-
lation are
[λj] :
q˙λj
qλj
= r −
(
ekj − 1
ekj
pxj
qλj
Lxj +
∂λ˙j
∂λj
+
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλjuj,i
qλj
)
, (23)
k = CR,BR,
where the first term in brackets is the benefit from accumulating knowledge in terms
of increased output. The second term is the benefit in terms of higher amount of
knowledge available for subsequent knowledge accumulation,
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξ
[
1 + (1− α)
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(
ui,jλi
λj
)α]
Lrj . (24)
In turn, the third term in brackets is the benefit in terms of increased amount of
knowledge that can be licensed.
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The demand for and the supply of knowledge in this case are
[ui,j] : pui,jλi = qλjξα
(
λj
ui,jλi
)1−α
Lrj , ∀i 6= j, (25)
[uj,i] : uj,i = 1, ∀i 6= j, (26)
which means that the firm has a downward sloping demand for knowledge and li-
censes/supplies all its knowledge.
In case when there are knowledge spillovers among high-tech firms (S.2) the returns
on knowledge accumulation are given by (23) but
puj,iλj = 0, ∀i, (27)
and
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξ (1− α)
[
N∑
i=1
(
λi
λj
)α]
Lrj . (28)
The first expression means that the licensees receive knowledge (patents) for free. In
turn, there is a difference between (24) and (28) because in S.1 case there are no
knowledge externalities within high-tech firms.
In turn, if there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3) the returns
on knowledge accumulation are given by (23) where the third term is absent and
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξ (1− α)Lrj . (29)
The expression for the price of knowledge (25) indicates that the licensees pay a
fixed fee for it. The fee is equal to their marginal valuation of the knowledge that
they acquire. This valuation includes all future benefits from using that knowledge
for augmenting their current knowledge. Therefore, the licensors appropriate all the
benefit from licensing knowledge (i.e., they make the ‘take it or leave it’ offer). With
a continuous accumulation of knowledge, as given by (12), at each and every instant
the licensees acquire new knowledge at a fixed fee.
It is clear from (23) that I have assumed that the firm does not take into account
the effect of accumulating knowledge on the price of knowledge puj,iλj . From (25) it
follows that puj,iλj declines with λj. In this sense, I focus on a perfect market for
knowledge (where the price of knowledge is equal to its marginal product and the
licensors appropriate all benefit). An alternative assumption would be that the firm
internalizes this effect. In such a circumstance there is an additional term in (23): the
derivative of puj,iλj with respect λj.
Even though taking into account this effect changes the incentives of accumulating
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knowledge, it does not affect the supply of knowledge (26). This is because supply
entails no costs and/or trade-offs.19
In the frames of this model the assumption that the licensors of knowledge do
not take into account that their knowledge is used for business stealing amounts to
assuming that firm j takes qλi for any i different than j as exogenous. This is in line
with assuming that it takes puj,iλj as exogenous.
Finally, in equilibrium there is no difference if high-tech firms license their knowledge
in return to wealth transfer or knowledge of other firms (plus-minus a fee). Therefore,
knowledge licensing among high-tech firms can also be thought to resemble patent
consortia or pools.
Firm Entry
I focus on two regimes of ”entry” into the high-tech industry. In the first regime there
are exogenous barriers to entry (i.e., there is no entry) and all firms in the market are
assumed to have entered at time 0 (t = 0). In the second regime there are no barriers
to entry into the high-tech industry. Moreover, entry entails no costs. To certain
extent such a setup might be more appropriate for modelling exit rather than entry.
This setup allows to have tractable results for the case when there is no exchange of
knowledge among high-tech firms. Later in the text I offer and highlight the balanced
growth path properties of a setup where entry entails endogenous costs for the cases
when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.1-2).
In order to support symmetric equilibrium, I assume that the entrants into the
high-tech industry have the highest productivity available at that date. Further, I
assume that high-tech firms do not coordinate on their entry and exit strategies.
3 Features of the Dynamic Equilibrium
I restrict the attention to a symmetric equilibrium in the high-tech industry.
I denote the growth rate of a variable Z by gZ . Further, for subsequent analysis it
is useful to define functions INS.1−2 and I
1
S.2−3 as
INS.1−2 =
{
1 for S.3,
N otherwise
19Appendix E.4 derives the model under this alternative assumption. It shows that high-tech firms
innovate less if they take into account the effect of knowledge accumulation on the price of knowledge.
This is because innovating decreases their returns on knowledge licensing.
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and
I1S.2−3 =
{
0 for S.1,
1 otherwise.
The growth rate of knowledge/productivity in cases when there is an exchange of
knowledge among high-tech firms (S.1-2) is given by (12), (13), and (14). In case when
there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3) it is given by (15). Using INS.1−2 it can be
written as
gλ = ξI
N
S.1−2Lr, (30)
for all S.1-3 cases.
The (internal) rate of return on knowledge accumulation can be derived from the
optimal rules of the high-tech firm (19), (20), and (23)-(29). It is given by
gqλ = r − gλ
(
Lx
Lr
+ 1− αI1S.2−3
)
. (31)
This expression determines the allocation of labor to R&D in a high-tech firm relative
to the allocation of labor to production. Here, this ratio does not (explicitly) depend on
competitive pressure in the high-tech industry. This is because high-tech firms decide
on the division of labor between production and R&D internally and Lx and Lr are
paid the same wage.
From the high-tech firm’s demand for labor for production (19), the representative
final goods producer’s optimal rules (6)-(7), and the relation between PXX and pxx
(9) follows a relationship between NLx and LY ,
NLx =
σ
1− σb
kLY , (32)
where
bk =
ek − 1
ek
. (33)
This relationship shows the effect of price setting by high-tech firms. In symmetric
equilibrium the perceived elasticities of substitution are
eBR = ε− ε− 1
N
, (34)
eCR =
ε
1 + ε−1
N
. (35)
Therefore, competition is tougher and mark-ups are lower if high-tech firms compete
in prices, eBR > eCR. Moreover, mark-ups decline with the number of firms N and ε.
This implies that the ratio LY
NLx
declines with N , ε and toughness of competition. This
is because as the competitive pressure in the high-tech industry increases the relative
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price of x declines, which increases NLx. Meanwhile, final goods producers substitute
X for LY which reduces LY .
From (32) it is clear also that LY
NLx
declines with σ and does not depend on µ. The
first result holds because higher σ implies higher marginal product of X and lower
marginal product of LY . The second result stems from the assumption that efficiency
gains due to external effects are Hicks-neutral.
The relationship between NLx and LY (32) together with labor market clearing
condition,
L = LY +N (Lx + Lr) , (36)
implies a relationship between NLx and NLr,
NLx = D
k (L−NLr) , (37)
where
Dk =
σ
(
ek − 1)
ek − σ .
20 (38)
Meanwhile, in the final goods market since either there is no entry or entry entails
no costs and the assets in this economy are the high-tech firms it has to be the case
that
Y = C, (39)
which means that all final output is consumed.
Entry Regime 1: Exogenous Barriers to Entry
I take N > 1 and allow profits pi in (18) to be negative. This is needed in order to
characterize the behavior of labor force allocations and growth rate of knowledge for
any N > 1, ε, and type of competition, and can be supported by subsidies, for example.
Decentralized Equilibrium
Since there are exogenous barriers to entry the number of firms is fixed,
N˙ = gN = g ek−1
ek
= 0.
20Dk measures the effect of competitive pressure in the high-tech industry on allocations of labor force.
Appendix E.5 shows that in the limiting case when σ = 1 competitive pressure in the high-tech
industry does not matter for these allocations. This is because in such a case there are no relative
price distortions.
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In such a case from (39) it follows that consumption and final output grow at the same
rate,
gC = gY . (40)
Let the consumers be sufficiently patient so that θ ≥ 1, which is a standard stability
condition in multi-sector endogenous growth models and seems to be the empirically
relevant case.
Proposition 1. Let the following parameter restriction hold for any sufficiently small
N :
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L > ρ. (41)
In such a case, in decentralized equilibrium in all S.1-3 cases the economy makes a
discrete ”jump” to balanced growth path where labor force allocations and growth rates
of knowledge/productivity and final output are given by
NLNEr =
N
ξINS.1−2
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
, (42)
NLNEx = D
k
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
L+ N
ξINS.1−2
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
, (43)
LNEY =
1− σ
σbk
Dk
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
L+ N
ξINS.1−2
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
, (44)
and
gNEY = (σ + µ) g
NE
λ , (45)
gNEλ =
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
. (46)
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
I use NE superscript for equilibrium labor force allocations and growth rates to
denote the case when there is no entry. Parameter restriction (41) ensures that the
inter-temporal benefit from allocating labor force to R&D outweighs its cost.
If parameter restriction (41) does not hold high-tech firms do not innovate. There-
fore, the economy is static (gλ = gY = 0) and the labor force allocations in all S.1-3
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cases are given by
NLNEr = 0, (47)
NLNEx = D
kL, (48)
LNEY =
1− σ
σbk
NLNEx . (49)
This restriction may not hold for large N if there is no exchange of knowledge amonf
high-tech firms (S.3) since when INS.1−2 = 1 the left-hand-side of the inequality tends to
zero as N increases. In case when there is no exchange of knowledge, therefore, if N is
sufficiently large then the economy is on balanced growth path where gλ = gY = 0 and
labor force allocations are given by (47)-(49). In this respect, if parameter restriction
(41) holds for any sufficiently small N > 1 then it always holds in cases when there is an
exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.1-2). This is because when INS.1−2 = N
the left-hand-side of the inequality increases with N .
Without loss of generality, hereafter, I assume that (41) holds for any finite N and
does not hold in case when there is no knowledge exchange among high-tech firms (i.e.,
INS.1−2 = 1) if N is arbitrarily large/infinite (N = +∞).
Proposition 2. Let parameter restriction (41) hold. If high-tech firms choose not to
engage in R&D then labor force allocations are given by (47)-(49). Moreover, the value
of high-tech firms is higher if none of the high-tech firms engages in R&D.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
I further assume that high-tech firms cannot collude and not innovate (for example,
because of antitrust regulation or non-sustainability of collusion). In this respect, the
reason why in decentralized equilibrium each high-tech firm prefers to engage in R&D
is that R&D reduces its marginal cost. Therefore, ceteris paribus it allows the firm to
lower its price and capture more market.
Social Optimum
The hypothetical Social Planner selects the paths of quantities so that to maximize the
lifetime utility of the household (1). The Social Planner internalizes all externalities
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and solves the following problem.
max
Lx,Lr
U =
+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt (50)
s.t.
C =
(
N
ε
ε−1λLx
)σ+µ
[L−N (Lx + Lr)]1−σ , (51)
λ˙ = ξINS.1−2λLr, (52)
λ (0) > 0.
The Social Planner’s optimal choices for Lx and Lr are given by
[Lx] : NLx = D
SP (L−NLr) , (53)
[Lr] : qλξI
N
S.1−2λ =
(1− σ)N
L−N (Lx + Lr)C
1−θ, (54)
where
DSP =
σ + µ
1 + µ
, (55)
and I use SP superscript to make a distinction between the outcomes of Social Planner’s
choice and decentralized equilibrium outcomes. Meanwhile, its returns on knowledge
accumulation are given by
[λ] : q˙λ = qλρ−
[
qλξI
N
S.1−2Lr + (σ + µ)λ
−1C1−θ
]
. (56)
The optimal choice of Lx (53) together with labor market clearing condition (36)
implies that
NLx =
1 + µ
1− σD
SPLY . (57)
This relation is the counterpart of (32) in decentralized equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Let the following parameter restriction hold for any sufficiently small
N :
ξDSP
INS.1−2
N
L > ρ. (58)
In such a case, the Social Planner chooses labor force allocations such that the economy,
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where there is ”no entry”, makes a discrete jump to balanced growth path, where
NLNE,SPr =
N
ξINS.1−2
ξDSP
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP , (59)
NLNE,SPx = D
SP
(θ − 1) (σ + µ)L+ N
ξINS.1−2
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP , (60)
LNE,SPY =
1− σ
σ + µ
DSP
(θ − 1) (σ + µ)L+ N
ξINS.1−2
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP . (61)
and
gNE,SPY = (σ + µ) g
NE,SP
λ , (62)
gNE,SPλ =
ξDSP
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP . (63)
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
Parameter restriction (58) necessarily holds as long as (41) holds since DSP >
Dk. As in decentralized equilibrium, this inequality states that the benefit from R&D
outweighs its cost.
Given that C in (51) satisfies Inada conditions no corner solutions in terms of NLx
or LY satisfy the Social Planner’s optimal problem.
Proposition 4. Meanwhile, if (58) holds no corner solutions in terms of NLr satisfy
the Social Planner’s optimal problem. In case, however, parameter restriction (58)
does not hold the Social Planner sets
NLr = 0, (64)
and the remaining labor force allocations according to
NLNE,SPx = D
SPL, (65)
LNE,SPY =
1− σ
σ + µ
DSPL. (66)
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
This parameter restriction does not hold if N is arbitrarily large/infinite and there
is no knowledge exchange in the economy (S.3). It holds, however, for any N in cases
when there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) since I have assumed that so does (41).
I further assume that the Social Planner can choose between S.1-2 and S.3 cases. In
terms of policies implemented by a government in decentralized equilibrium this cor-
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responds to motivating or banning knowledge exchange in the economy.21 Clearly, the
Social Planner prefers S.1-2 over S.3 since it could set the same labor force allocations
and have higher economic growth in S.1-2 cases. Therefore, in this sense it is socially
desirable to have knowledge exchange in the economy.
Comparative Statics and Comparisons
Within the decentralized equilibrium outcomes, first, I discuss the case when the num-
ber of high-tech firms N is finite (N < +∞). Next, I discuss the limiting case when
the number of high-tech firms is infinite (N = +∞) and, therefore, (41) does not hold
if there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3). In the end of the
section I compare the decentralized equilibrium allocations and growth rates with the
choice of the Social Planner.
Proposition 5. In all S.1-3 cases the growth rate of knowledge/productivity (gλ) and
the growth rate of final output (gY ) increase with the elasticity of substitution between
high-tech goods (ε). Moreover, gλ and gY are higher under Bertrand competition which
is tougher than Cournot competition.
Proof. These results follow from (33)-(35), (38), (45), and (46).
The driver behind these results are the relative price distortions, which are due
to price setting by high-tech firms. These distortions increase the demand for labor
in final goods production. Increasing the elasticity of substitution or the toughness
of competition reduces these distortions. The reduction of distortions motivates final
goods producers to substitute (a basket of) high-tech goods for labor. Higher demand
for high-tech goods and higher amount of available labor increase the incentives of
high-tech firms to conduct R&D. This increases gλ and gY .
Corollary 6. In this respect, in all S.1-3 cases NLr and NLx grow and LY declines
with the elasticity of substitution ε and toughness of competition.
Proof. This result follows from (42)-(44).
The comparative statics with respect to the number of high-tech firms in cases when
there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) are different from the case when there is no
exchange of knowledge (S.3). The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms
(S.1-2), labor force allocations NLr and NLx and growth rates gλ and gY increase with
the number of firms N , whereas LY declines with it. If there is no exchange of knowledge
(S.3), however, this result does not hold if the number of firms is relatively high.
21An example for such policy/action is the establishment of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA
Corporation) that fostered cross-licensing in the telecommunications industry in the US.
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Proof. These results follow from (42)-(46).
The driver behind the first result is the reduction in relative price distortions (or
the intensification of competition) that the higher number of high-tech firms brings
with it. Meanwhile, the second result holds because increasing the number of high-
tech firms if there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3) has two
effects. It reduces the relative price distortions and the amount of labor force that can
be devoted to R&D [see
INS.1−2
N
term in (46)]. The first effect motivates higher demand
for NLr and increases gλ, whereas the second effect reduces NLr and gλ. The second
effect is absent in cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms
(S.1-2) because increasing the number of high-tech firms also increases the amount
of complementary knowledge made available by these firms. Clearly, the result that
these effects exactly offset each other hinges on the functional form assumptions for
knowledge accumulation processes (12), (13) and (14).22
Proposition 8.
• In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.1-2)
gλ and gY are concave functions of the number of firms N .
• In case when there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3) the derivative of gλ, as well
as gY , with respect to N is positive when N is close to 1 and it is negative for
any N greater than 2.
Proof. These results follow from (46) and that in cases when there is knowledge ex-
change among high-tech firms INS.1−2 = N , whereas I
N
S.1−2 = 1 if there is no knowledge
exchange.
The first part of this proposition holds because competition intensifies more from
adding a firm if there are few high-tech firms. Meanwhile, the second part holds because
in case when there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3) at the higher levels of market con-
centration/lower levels of competition (N ≈ 1) the positive effect of higher competition
is dominant. Meanwhile, at the lower levels of market concentration/higher levels of
competition (N > 2) the negative effect of the reduction in the amount of resource for
R&D is dominant. The full characterization of the behavior of gλ and gY for N ∈ (1, 2)
is not so straightforward, however. This is because of high non-linearity of gλ in that
interval. In the neighborhood of N = 1 the growth rate of knowledge/productivity gλ
22One way to relax this assumption is to multiply (12) and (14) by a function z (N), where z′ ≤ 0. As
long as z (N)Dk increases with N the results remain intact. If, however, z (N)Dk decreases with
N at least for sufficiently large N then the results would become similar to the case when there is no
exchange of knowledge.
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is increasing and concave in N and after a tipping point from (1, 2) it becomes convex
and decreasing.23
Proposition 9.
• In all S.1-3 cases labor force allocations NLr and NLx and growth rates gλ and
gY increase with σ, whereas LY declines with it. In contrast, gλ and NLr decline
with µ and gY , NLx, and LY increase with it.
• In cases when there are knowledge spillovers/externalities (S.2-3) NLr, gλ and
gY decline with α, whereas NLx and LY increase with it.
Proof. These results follow from (42)-(46).
The first result holds because higher σ increases the marginal product of high-
tech goods bundle X and reduces the marginal product of labor force employed in
final goods production LY . Therefore, the demand for LY declines and labor force
allocations NLx and NLr increase. According to (45) and (46) this implies that gλ
and the growth rate of final output gY increase with σ. In contrast, higher µ does not
affect the balance between the demand for X and LY and in this sense does not alter
the production and R&D incentives of high-tech firms. Meanwhile, ceteris paribus
it increases the growth rate of final output gY and equilibrium interest rate r [see
(3)], which discourages investments in R&D. Lower NLr implies lower growth rate of
knowledge/productivity gλ. Finally, the second part of this proposition holds because in
case there are knowledge spillovers/externalities as α increases the internalized returns
on R&D decline and firms invest less in R&D. Therefore, more labor force is allocated
to production activities, and gλ and gY decline.
In order to preserve space, hereafter, unless stated otherwise, I exclusively discuss
the results for the growth rate of knowledge/productivity gλ while keeping in mind
that the growth rate of final output gY is proportional to it.
Corollary 10. If the number of high-tech firms is arbitrarily large/infinite
• when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.1-2) labor force
allocations and growth rate gλ are given by (42)-(44), and (46) where
Dk ≡ D = σ (ε− 1)
ε− σ ;
23This result implies that in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3)
there is an ”inverted-U” shape relationship between gλ and the number of firms N . A similar result
can be obtained also in cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.1-2)
assuming fixed management costs as in van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) or that (12) and (14)
increase less than linearly with N .
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• when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3) gλ = 0 and
labor force allocations are given by (47)-(49) where Dk ≡ D.
The first part of this corollary implies that when there is an exchange of knowledge
among high-tech firms and N = +∞ neither labor force allocations nor the growth rate
of knowledge depend on the type of competition and the number of high-tech firms.
It implies also that the remaining comparative statics stay intact in these cases. The
second part of the corollary holds because when there is no exchange of knowledge
among high-tech firms and N = +∞ parameter restriction (41) does not hold. It can
be shown that in this case, NLx increases and LY declines with σ and ε and both NLx
and LY do not depend on the type of competition and parameters α and µ.
Corollary 11. For both finite and infinite number of high-tech firms the comparison
between S.1-3 cases yields the following relationships.
NLNE,S.1r > NL
NE,S.2
r > NL
NE,S.3
r ,
NLNE,S.1x < NL
NE,S.2
x < NL
NE,S.3
x ,
LNE,S.1Y < L
NE,S.2
Y < L
NE,S.3
Y ,
gNE,S.1λ > g
NE,S.2
λ > g
NE,S.3
λ . (67)
This means that in decentralized equilibrium with no entry high-tech firms innovate
the most in case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1). High-tech firms innovate the
least if there is no exchange of knowledge among these firms (S.3). Therefore, for a
given N the growth rate of final output is the highest in case when there is knowledge
licensing and the lowest in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-
tech firms.
In order to further highlight the contrast between all knowledge accumulation/R&D
setups (S.1-3) Figure 1 plots gλ for parameter values θ = 4, ρ = 0.01, σ = 0.3, µ = 0.01,
ε = 4, L = 1, ξ = 1, and α = 0.1 and Cournot and Bertrand types of competition.24
Comparisons Between Decentralized Equilibrium and Socially Optimal Re-
sults: Different types of competitive pressure matter for these decentralized equilib-
rium outcomes because of market interactions among high-tech firms. They do not
matter, however, for the outcomes of the Social Planner’s problem (59)-(63).
Corollary 12. In contrast to the decentralized equilibrium results NLSPr , NL
SP
x , gλ, and
gY increase with µ and L
SP
Y declines with this parameter.
Proof. This result follows from (59)-(63).
24The parameter values were selected so that the growth rate of final output has a reasonable value.
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Figure 1: The Growth Rate of Productivity in S.1-3 Cases
This result holds because the Social Planner internalizes µ and higher µ implies
higher marginal product of X.
Corollary 13. For both finite and infinite N the comparison between decentralized
equilibrium growth rates and allocations and socially optimal growth rates and alloca-
tions yields the following relationships.
NLNE,SP,S.1−2r > NL
NE,S.1
r ,
NLNE,SP,S.1−2x Q NLNE,S.3x ,
NLNE,SP,S.1−2x Q NLNE,S.2x ,
NLNE,SP,S.1−2x > NL
NE,S.1
x ,
LNE,SP,S.1−2Y < L
NE,S.1
Y ,
and
gNE,SP,S.1−2λ > g
NE,S.1
λ ,
where Q indicates that the relation depends on model parameters.
This means that in decentralized equilibrium the economy innovates less than it is
socially optimal and therefore grows at a lower rate. Moreover, in decentralized equi-
librium it fails to have socially optimal labor force allocations. The driver behind these
results are the relative price distortions and externalities. Due to these distortions final
goods producers substitute labor for high-tech goods which lowers the output of high-
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tech firms and the number of researchers that high-tech firms hire. The externalities
in R&D have an effect of similar direction. If such externalities are present then high-
tech firms do not fully internalize the returns on R&D. This reduces their incentives
to invest in R&D and they hire lower number of researchers. Meanwhile, externalities
in final goods production increase interest rate r. Since high-tech firms do not take
into account these externalities they invest less than it is socially optimal. Final goods
producers also do not take into account these externalities. Therefore, they demand
less than socially optimal amount of high-tech goods.
The differences between socially optimal and decentralized equilibrium growth rates
and labor force allocations in terms of the relative price distortions and externalities
in final goods production are summarized by Dk and DSP . It is easy to notice that for
sufficiently high N
lim
µ→0
DSP = lim
ε→+∞
Dk.
This equality holds because for sufficiently high N the limiting case ε = +∞ would
imply perfect competition in the high-tech industry. In such a limiting case, however,
in decentralized equilibrium high-tech firms make zero profits and have no market
incentives to innovate.
In this respect, if there are no subsidies that keep the profits of high-tech firms non-
negative, the positive relationship between innovation and ε holds as long as high-tech
firms have sufficient profits to cover the costs of R&D. Profits of high-tech firms and ε
are inversely related. Once profits net of R&D expenditures are equal to zero increasing
ε reduces innovation to zero. Therefore, if there are no subsidies the relationship
between intensity of product market competition (ε) and innovation has an ”inverted-
U” shape. Such a relation is consistent with Schumpeter’s argument that firms need to
be sufficiently big in order to innovate. Moreover, it is in line with the empirical findings
of Aghion et al. (2005) and provides an alternative explanation for those findings.
Entry Regime 2: Cost-free Entry
In this section I endogenize the number of firms assuming that entry cost is zero.
Decentralized Equilibrium
From (18), (19) and (31) it follows that the profits of a high-tech firm are
pi = wLx
[
1
ek − 1 −
gλ
r − gqλ −
(
1− αI1S.2−3
)
gλ
]
.
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Given that entry cost is zero the condition that endogenizes the number of high-tech
firms is pi = 0.
Denote
p¯i =
1
ek − 1 −
gλ
r − gqλ −
(
1− αI1S.2−3
)
gλ
. (68)
Therefore,
pi = 0⇔ p¯i = 0. (69)
Proposition 14. At time 0 (t = 0) N makes a discrete jump to the balanced growth
path equilibrium level.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
This implies that in decentralized equilibrium with cost-free entry the economy is
on a balanced growth path (for any t > 0), where
N˙ = gN = g ek−1
ek
= 0.
Therefore, labor force allocations and growth rate of knowledge/productivity are given
by (42)-(44) and (46), where the number of high-tech firms N is endogenous.
In turn, N can derived from the zero profit condition (69) and gλ that solves the
capital market equilibrium (46). The growth rate of productivity gλ that solves the
zero profit condition (69) is
gλ =
ρ
ek − 1− αI1S.2−3 − (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
. (70)
Let
ε− 1− α− (θ − 1) (σ + µ) > 0,
which implies that gλ can be positive for sufficiently large N or, equivalently, there can
exist decentralized equilibrium where high-tech firms innovate.
Hereafter, I call gλ from (70) ZP – zero profit, and gλ from (46) CME – capital
market equilibrium. If α > 0 and/or θ > 1 the number of high-tech firms N that
satisfies
ek − 1− α− (θ − 1) (σ + µ) = 0
is strictly greater than 1. Denote it by N∗. For N ∈ (1, N∗) it can be shown that gλ
in (70) or ZP is negative, decreasing, and convex function of N and
lim
N→N∗−
gλ = −∞.
Meanwhile for N > N∗ it can be shown that ZP is positive, decreasing, and convex
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function of N and
lim
N→N∗+
gλ = +∞.
Proposition 15. In decentralized equilibrium with endogenous entry it cannot happen
so that N ∈ (1, N∗).
Proof. This is because for N ∈ (1, N∗) high-tech firms do not innovate, which implies
that the profit of each firm is
pi = wLx
1
ek − 1 > 0.
Therefore, there will be entry that will increase the number of high-tech firms above
N∗.
Both CME and ZP are continuous functions of N for N > N∗, the values of CME
are finite for any N > 1, and ZP is arbitrarily large around N∗. Therefore, at least for
N sufficiently close to N∗ it has to be the case that ZP is higher CME. This means
that there exists decentralized equilibrium where high-tech firms innovate.
If ZP crosses CME from above then the decentralized equilibrium determined by
the intersection is stable in the sense that the entry of firms reduces p¯i in (68) and exit
increases it. The number of firms and the growth rate of productivity can be solved
from the intersection of CME and ZP in such a case. Moreover, if at time 0 (t = 0)
the number of high-tech firms is higher than (and in S.3 case sufficiently close to) the
number determined by the intersection of ZP and CME then high-tech firms will exit
the market till ZP and CME are equal. Considering such a setup, or exit of high-tech
firms instead of entry, can support the zero entry costs assumption.
In order to have meaningful equilibrium in each of S.1-3 cases [i.e., (69) holds] I
further assume that the parameters are such that there exists N∗∗ where ZP crosses
CME under Cournot competition in case when there is no exchange of knowledge
(S.3). Given that (46) shifts up and (70) shifts down with the elasticity of substitution
ε this can be equivalent to assuming that the elasticity of substitution ε is sufficiently
high. It implies that ZP crosses CME in all the remaining S.1-3 cases.25
The previous section showed that if there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) the
growth rate of knowledge gλ from (46), or CME, is monotonically increasing function
of N .
Corollary 16. In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms
(S.1-2) ZP crosses CME from above and the number of high-tech firms under Bertrand
25van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) offers a model which resembles the case when there is no
exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3). The authors assume parameter values such that
ZP crosses CME from above. Clearly, such a set of parameter values is restrictive for cases when
there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.1-2).
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and Cournot types of competition can be found from
ek =
ξσL
[
1 + αI1S.2−3 + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
]
ξσL− ρ , (71)
where k = CR,BR and eb and ec are given by (34) and (35).
If there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3), however, CME is not a monotonic
function for all N . It is monotonically increasing function in the neighborhood of
N = 1 and monotonically decreasing after some N ∈ (1, 2). Moreover, it is continuous
and finite for any N and negative for N = 1 and N = +∞. Therefore, given that ZP
is a monotonically decreasing function and it is positive for any N , ZP crosses CME
at least twice.
Corollary 17. If there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms then the
number of firms under Bertrand and Cournot types of competition can be found from
ek =
ξσ 1
N
L [1 + α + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)]
ξσ 1
N
L− ρ . (72)
It is straightforward to show that (72) is a quadratic equation in N . This means in
case there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3) ZP crosses CME
twice. It does so from above and from below. The smaller root of (72) corresponds
to the stable equilibrium where ZP crosses CME from above. Meanwhile, the bigger
root corresponds to the case when ZP crosses CME from below and the equilibrium
is not stable. Denote it by N∗∗2 . If the economy starts with a number of firms greater
or equal to N∗∗2 then p¯i does not decline to zero as N increases. In order to rule this
out I further assume that the economy starts with a number of high-tech firms that is
lower than N∗∗2 . Therefore, depending on whether ZP is higher or lower than CME,
firms exit or enter till (the point where) ZP crosses CME from above.26
Social Optimum
In this case the hypothetical Social Planner solves the optimal problem (50) and chooses
N .
The Social Planner’s optimal choice for N in case when there is an exchange of
knowledge (S.1-2) is given by
[N ] :
σ + µ
ε− 1
C1−θ
N
≥ 0
26The functional forms of knowledge accumulation process in cases when there is an exchange of knowl-
edge among high-tech firms (S.1-2) help to avoid this assumption.
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or simply
N = +∞, (73)
whereas if there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3) it is given by
[N ] :
σ + µ
ε− 1C
1−θ ≥ qλξλLr, (74)
The former result (73) holds because if there is an exchange of knowledge then
INS.1−2 = N and the Social Planner has no trade-offs while increasing N .
27 In contrast,
if there is no exchange of knowledge then INS.1−2 = 1 and it has a trade-off. Higher N
implies lower growth rate.
In order to be able to solve the optimal control problem in cases when there is an
exchange of knowledge (INS.1−2 = N) with first order conditions C needs to be rescaled
by N so that at time zero C < +∞ (i.e., C needs to be divided to N σ+µε−1 ).
Proposition 18. The Social Planner selects labor force allocations and N such that
the economy makes a discrete jump to balanced growth path.
• If there is an exchange of knowledge, on this path labor force allocations and
growth rate of knowledge gλ are given by (59)-(61) and (63) and N = +∞.
• If there no exchange of knowledge and (74) is binding then
N =
ξ (σ + µ)
ρ
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ) L, (75)
gCFE,SP,S.3λ =
ρ
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ) , (76)
where CFE stands for cost-free entry.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
If there is no exchange of knowledge and (74) is binding labor force allocations can
be derived from (52), (53), (57), and (76), where the expression (76) is the counterpart
of ZP (70) with N = +∞ and α = 0.
Comparing the lifetime utility of the household it can be shown, however, that
the Social Planner prefers to set N = +∞ also in case when there is no exchange of
knowledge. Therefore, (74) does not bind. The following proposition summarizes this
result.
27In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) the Social Planner selects at time zero
N = +∞ because of the assumption that firm entry or creating high-tech goods entails no costs. If
there were costs associated with entry (or costs associated with maintaining the goods/firms as in
van de Klundert and Smulders, 1997) the Social Planner might not select at time zero (or at any
time) N = +∞.
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Proposition 19. In case when there is no exchange of knowledge the Social Planner
sets
N = +∞,
gCFE,SP,S.3λ = NL
CFE,SP,S.3
r = 0, (77)
NLCFE,SP,S.3x = D
SPL, (78)
LCFE,SP,S.3Y =
1− σ
σ + µ
DSPL. (79)
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
As it was shown in the Social optimum section of Entry Regime 1 this implies that
the Social Planner prefers the case when there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) over
the case when there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3). This result is not stemming from
the cost-free entry assumption. Even if there were fixed costs associated with entry
the Social Planner could set the number of firms in case when there is an exchange
of knowledge (S.1-2) equal to the number of firms it finds optimal in case when there
is no exchange of knowledge (S.3). In such a circumstance according to (63) it would
have higher growth rate and, therefore, welfare in case when there is an exchange of
knowledge (S.1-2).
Comparative Statics and Comparisons
The following proposition establishes the comparative statics results for the number of
high-tech firms.
Proposition 20.
• In all S.1-3 cases, there are fewer high-tech firms in equilibrium under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition. Further, the number of firms de-
clines with ε and increases with µ.
• In cases when there are knowledge spillovers/externalities (S.2-3) the number in-
creases with α. It does not depend on α in case when there is knowledge licensing
(S.1).
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
The number of firms declines with toughness of competition and ε since tougher
competition and higher ε imply lower mark-ups, which reduces p¯i for a given N .
In turn, it increases with µ since higher µ implies lower R&D investments (fixed
costs), which increases p¯i for a given N . Higher α in cases when there are knowledge
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spillovers/externalities (S.2-3) also implies lower R&D investments. The comparative
statics with respect σ depend on model parameters.
Proposition 21. In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech
firms
• gλ and labor force allocations do not depend on the type of competition, ε, and
N .
• gλ and NLr decrease with α and µ, NLx increases with these parameters, and
gY declines with α but increases with µ.
Proof. The first part of the proposition holds because in cases when there is an exchange
of knowledge ek in (71) does not depend on the type of competition, ε, and N . See
Proofs Appendix for the second part of the proposition.
The analytical derivations for comparative statics with respect to σ and for labor
force allocation to final goods production LY are not trivial. Numerical simulations
where L is normalized to 1 and the remaining parameters are from the following inter-
vals
θ ∈ [1, 10] , ρ ∈ [0.01, 0.1] , σ ∈ [0.01, 0.99] , (80)
µ ∈ [0.01, 0.99] , ξ ∈ [0.1, 10] , α ∈ [0.01, 0.99] ,
show that:where + means positive relationship, − negative, and ± that the relationship
Table 1: Numerical Comparative Statics for S.1-2 Cases
gλ NLr NLx LY gY
σ + + + − +
µ − − + ± +
α − − + ± −
Note: This table offers numerical comparative statics for the cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among
high-tech firms (S.1-2). The values of parameters are from intervals (80) and satisfy parameter restrictions. Grids are
equally spaced and each has 5 points.
depends on model parameters.
If there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3) it is not straight-
forward to derive the relationship between the toughness of competition and growth
rate of productivity gλ. This is because of high non-linearity of CME in this case.
Nevertheless, it is possible to show that if ZP crosses CME from above in the region
of N where CME is monotonically increasing then the growth rate of productivity gλ is
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higher under Bertrand competition. The comparison of the labor allocations using an-
alytical techniques also is not trivial. Numerical simulations show that under Cournot
competition gλ, NLr are lower and NLx is higher than under Bertrand competition.
Meanwhile, depending on model parameters LY can be both higher and lower.
The analytical derivation of comparative statics for labor force allocations and
growth rates of final output and knowledge with respect to parameters ε, σ, µ, and
α also are not trivial in case when there is no knowledge exchange among high-tech
firms. Numerical simulations show that:
Table 2: Numerical Comparative Statics for S.3 Case
gλ NLr NLx LY gY
ε + + − ± +
σ ± ± ± ± ±
µ ± ± + ± ±
α − − + ± −
Note: This table offers numerical comparative statics for the cases when there is no exchange of knowledge among
high-tech firms (S.3). The values of parameters are from intervals (80) and satisfy parameter restrictions. Grids are
equally spaced and each has 5 points.
The following proposition summarizes the comparisons among different settings for
R&D process.
Proposition 22. The growth rate of knowledge/productivity gλ is higher in case when
there is knowledge licensing (S.1) compared to the case when there are knowledge
spillovers among high-tech firms (S.2). Moreover, it is higher in case when there are
knowledge spillovers among high-tech firms (S.2) compared to the case when there is
no exchange of knowledge (S.3), i.e.,
gCFE,S.1λ > g
CFE,S.2
λ > g
CFE,S.3
λ .
Proof. The first inequality follows from that gλ declines with α. In turn, the second
inequality follows from (67) given that ZP is monotonically decreasing function of N
and CME in cases there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) is monotonically increasing
function of N .
Given that R&D investments are fixed costs, this implies that there are more high-
tech firms in case when there are knowledge spillovers among these firms (S.2) than in
case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1). Moreover, there are more high-tech firms
in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among these firms (S.3) compared to
the case when there are knowledge spillovers (S.2), i.e.,
NCFE,S.3 > NCFE,S.2 > NCFE,S.1.
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The differences between labor force allocations in cases there is an exchange of knowl-
edge (S.1-2) and there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3) depend on model parameters.
These results indicate that high-tech firms innovate more in cases when there is an
exchange of knowledge compared to the case when there is none. Moreover, these firms
innovate more in case when there is knowledge licensing compared to the case there
are knowledge spillovers/externalities. Meanwhile, using (42)-(44), (46), (59)-(61), and
(63) it can be shown that in all S.1-3 cases in decentralized equilibrium with cost-free
(endogenous) entry into the high-tech industry the economy invests in R&D less than
it is socially optimal. Therefore, it grows at a lower than socially optimal rate. Further,
it fails to have socially optimal number of high-tech firms.
Policies leading to the first best outcome in decentralized equi-
librium
In this section I offer policies that if implemented in decentralized equilibrium lead to
the first best outcome. I assume that there is knowledge licensing in decentralized equi-
librium. This can amount to assuming that the government has motivated knowledge
exchange among high-tech firms that happens in a market where the licensors have the
right to make a ‘take it or leave it’ offer (i.e., they have the bargaining power). In this
respect, such an action is one of the necessary policy instruments for increasing welfare
in decentralized equilibrium.28
I assume that the set of policy instruments includes marginal taxes on or subsidies
to purchases of high-tech goods (τx) and high-tech firms’ expenditures on buying knowl-
edge (τλ). It also includes lump-sum transfers to high-tech firms (Tpi) and households
(T ). The latter balances government expenditures.
Under such a policy from the final goods producer’s problem it follows that (8) and
(9) need to be rewritten as
xj = X
[
PX
(1− τx) pxj
]ε
,
PXX = (1− τx)
N∑
i=1
pxixi.
28This is because in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms there is no
set of (orthodox) policy instruments in terms of welfare transfers which in decentralized equilibrium
equates labor force allocations and growth rate of knowledge to their socially optimal counterparts.
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In turn, the profit function of high-tech firm j is
pij = pxjxj − w
(
Lxj + Lrj
)
+
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλj (uj,iλj)− (1− τλ)
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
pui,jλi (ui,jλi)
]
+ Tpi.
Therefore, the demand for knowledge of the high-tech firm (25) needs to be rewritten
as
[ui,j] : (1− τλ) pui,jλi = qλjξα
(
λj
ui,jλi
)1−α
Lrj , ∀i 6= j.
Considering symmetric equilibrium and combining these optimal rules with (6), (7),
(24) and labor market clearing condition (36) gives the counterparts of the relation
between NLx and LY (32), returns on knowledge accumulation (31), and the relation
between NLx and NLr (37):
NLx =
1
1− τx
σ
1− σb
kLY , (81)
gqλ = r − gλ
(
Lx
Lr
+ 1 + α
N − 1
N
τλ
1− τλ
)
, (82)
NLx = D
GO (L−NLr) , (83)
where DGO is the counterpart of Dk,
DGO =
[
(1− τx) 1− σ
σ
1
bk
+ 1
]−1
,
and I use GO to denote decentralized equilibrium with government.
Proposition 23. Let the marginal tax rates be constant. In such a case, labor force
allocations and the growth rate of knowledge gλ are
NLr =
1
ξ
ξDGOL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DGO − αN−1
N
τλ
1−τλ
,
NLx = D
GO
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ)− αN−1
N
τλ
1−τλ
]
L+ 1
ξ
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DGO − αN−1
N
τλ
1−τλ
,
LY = (1− τx) 1− σ
σbk
NLx,
gλ = ξNLr.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
Therefore, in order to have socially optimal growth rate and allocations it is suffi-
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cient to have
NLr = NL
SP
r , NLx = NL
SP
x .
To achieve such an outcome it is sufficient to subsidize the purchases of high-tech goods,
τλ = 0, (84)
τx =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
, (85)
where τx equates D
GO to DSP . It is enough to subsidize the demand for high-tech
goods because the returns on knowledge accumulation are fully appropriated.29
Although under this policy labor force allocations and growth rate of knowledge
in decentralized equilibrium are equal to their socially optimal counterparts, welfare is
not. This is because in decentralized equilibrium there is lower number of high-tech
firms/goods. The policy instrument that can correct for this is Tpi. It is straightforward
to show that it is sufficient to set
Tpi = wLxτpi, (86)
where τpi is such that for any finite N the profits of high-tech firms are greater than
zero, but for N = +∞ profits are zero.
Corollary 24. The rate τpi can be derived from a zero profit condition and is given by
τpi =
ε− 1 +DSP
(ε− 1) [(θ − 1) (σ + µ) ξDSPL+DSP ] (87)
×
[
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
ε− 1 +DSP ξD
SPL− ρ
]
.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
The expression in the second line of τpi needs to be positive in order to have N > 1
in (75). Therefore, τpi is greater than zero implying that entry into high-tech industry
needs to be subsidized. Such subsidies are in the spirit of R&D subsidies in Romer
(1990) model to the extent that entry can be thought to be a result of R&D that
generates new types of high-tech goods.30
29Appendix E.6 offers a policy which instead of subsidizing the purchases of high-tech goods subsidizes
the production and R&D expenditures of high-tech firms. It shows that the subsidy rates to these
expenditures should be equal in order to have first best allocations and growth rates. This is because
in a high-tech firm the allocations of labor to production and R&D are affected by relative price
distortions equally.
30Appendix E.4 shows how τλ can be used together with τx in case when high-tech firms do not take
the price of knowledge as exogenous. If τλ 6= 0 then subsidy rate τpi is not given by (87).
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The result that τpi is greater than zero is not stemming from the cost-free entry
assumption. Next section shows that even if entry into the high-tech industry entailed
positive costs then still it could be that at least in very long-run the Social Planner sets
N = +∞ whereas in decentralized equilibrium the market is saturated for N < +∞.
The Social Planner can prefer having N = +∞ because as λ grows the marginal
product of N increases.
Entry Regime 3: Costly Entry
In this section I assume that entry into the high-tech industry entails endogenous costs.
I focus on the cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms.
Further, I do not assume that parameters are such that CME necessarily crosses ZP .
This restriction can be lifted since in case when entry entails endogenous costs positive
profits can be allowed.
Firm Entry
In order to enter into the high-tech industry and to generate its distinct type of high-
tech good, the potential producer has to invest. The investment is in terms of final
goods. The entrant should borrow the resources for the investment from the household
at the market interest rate r.
The creation of the distinct type of high-tech good is given by
N˙ = ηS, η ≥ 0, (88)
where N˙ is the new high-tech good created by the investment S and η is the efficiency
of investments.
The entrants are assumed to break-even on a zero net-value constraint,
V N˙ = S. (89)
From this expression, (2), (6), (7), (9), (18), (89), and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion V˙ = rV − pi it follows that for η ∈ (0,+∞)
Y = C + S, (90)
given that the assets in this economy are the high-tech firms (A = V N). Meanwhile,
in terms of previously analyzed cases of entry, η = 0 in (88) corresponds to the case
when there are exogenous barriers to entry. In such a case (89) does not bind. The
limiting case η = +∞ corresponds to cost-free endogenous entry. In such a case any
40
infinitesimally small investment leads to entry. Given that this investment is a cost,
the entrants would select to invest 0 and enter. Therefore, in both limiting cases η = 0
and η = +∞ (39) holds.
Hereafter, I assume that η is a small number (η ≈ 0). Such a restriction allows to
have no transition in the hypothetical Social Planner’s solution.
Decentralized Equilibrium
It is instructive to derive the profit function of a high-tech firm first. As in case when
entry entails no cost it can be written as
pi = wLxp¯i,
where
p¯i =
1
ek − 1 −
gλ
r −
(
gw − I0N˙=0gN
) , k = CR,BR, (91)
and
I0
N˙=0
=
{
1 for N˙ 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
Corollary 25. p¯i in (91) is monotonically decreasing function of N .
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
The competition intensifies with the number of firmsN . When strategic interactions
in the product market are non-negligible, the intensity of competition and profits are
related negatively. The negative relation between N and p¯i reflects exactly this point.
Hereafter, I focus only on the balanced growth path analysis. Depending on the
household’s preferences, final goods production technology and the high-tech firm’s
knowledge accumulation process, there are two cases when the economy grows at con-
stant rates. In the first case there are so many high-tech firms that the new entrant’s
impact on others’ demand is negligible. Whereas in the second case, the next entrant
will have negative profit streams (i.e., there are endogenous barriers to entry).31
In the first case, the counterpart of CME in (46) is always lower than the counter-
part of ZP in (70). On the balanced growth path there are infinitely many high-tech
firms and there is permanent entry (N = +∞, N˙ > 0).
31This ordering is possible given that p¯i in (91) is negatively related to the number of firms and the
investments in knowledge accumulation are fixed costs.
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Proposition 26. The growth rates of final output and knowledge are
gCEY = Bg
CE
λ ,
gCEλ =
ξDL− ρ(
θ − 1 + I0
N˙=0
)
B + αI1S.2−3 +D
, (92)
where I use superscript CE - costly entry - in order to distinguish the outcomes of this
setup and
B =
(ε− 1) (σ + µ)
ε− 1− I0
N˙=0
(σ + µ)
.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
Labor force allocations in this case can be derived from (30), (36), and (37). In the
denominator of gCEλ (92) I
0
N˙=0
captures the effect of continuous entry into the high-
tech industry on innovation incentives of high-tech firms. Continuous entry erodes the
returns on innovation. Ceteris paribus this leads to lower investments in R&D.
In the second case, let N∗∗ (< +∞) be the last high-tech firm that will have non-
negative profit streams if it enters. There is no entry after N∗∗ (i.e., N˙ = 0) because for
any N > N∗∗ the value V would be negative.32 When there is no entry, the economy
is on a balanced growth path; therefore, N∗∗ is determined from the intersection of
CME and ZP curves. In such a case, labor force allocations, growth rates and the
number of firms under different types of competition can be obtained from (42)-(46)
and (71).33
Social Optimum
The hypothetical Social Planner’s problem is given by (50)-(52) and (88). I assume
that the Social Planner can make negative investments in the high-tech industry (i.e.,
in N) and η is close to zero. These assumptions allow to have no transition in the
social optimum.
Proposition 27. The socially optimal growth rates of final output and knowledge are
32Strictly speaking, the firm that has zero profits invests zero; therefore, according to (88), it also
does not enter. Therefore, N∗∗ is an upper bound for the number of firms in the high-tech industry.
However, since p¯i in (91) is a continuous function of the number of firms, N∗∗ is exactly the number
of firms in high-tech industry.
33In case when there is no exchange of knowledge and the counterpart of ZP crosses the counterpart of
CME from above at finite N then the balanced growth path properties of the model are summarized
in the section Entry Regime 2. However, in case when ZP does not cross CME on balanced growth
the economy needs to be static in case B is finite and positive.
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given by
gCE,SPY = B
SPgCE,SPλ , (93)
gCE,SPλ =
ξDSPL− ρ
(θ − 1)BS +DSP , (94)
where
BSP =
(ε− 1) (σ + µ)
ε− 1− (σ + µ) .
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
The socially optimal labor force allocations can be found from
NLCE,SPr =
1
ξ
gCE,SPλ ,
NLCE,SPx = D
S
(
L−NLCE,SPr
)
,
LCE,SPY = L−NLCE,SPx −NLCE,SPr .
Corollary 28. There is permanent entry in the social optimum.
The permanent entry result is due to the absence of market incentives in the social
optimum. It stands in contrast to the decentralized equilibrium result where it may be
the case that there are endogenous barriers to entry. It holds because the accumulation
of knowledge (R&D) increases the marginal product of N .
Comparisons and Policy Inference
It is straightforward to show that in both cases when there are endogenous barriers to
entry in decentralized equilibrium (N˙ = 0) and there are no barriers to entry (N˙ > 0)
the following relationships hold:
gCE,SPλ > g
CE,S.1
λ > g
CE,S.2
λ .
Further, similar to the previous sections, it is straightforward to show that in both
cases when N˙ = 0 and N˙ > 0 in decentralized equilibrium the economy fails to have
socially optimal labor force allocations. From (93) and (94) it also follows that in the
social optimum the growth rate of final output is higher if there is continuous entry
compared to the case when there is no continuous entry.
Corollary 29. If there is continuous entry into the high-tech industry (N˙ > 0) and
knowledge licensing among high-tech firms, then the following policy delivers socially
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optimal allocations and growth rates as a decentralized equilibrium outcome.
τx =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
,
τλ =
N
N−1
1
α
B
1 + N
N−1
1
α
B
.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
In this policy τx is the same as in (85) and subsidizes the purchases of final goods.
In contrast, τλ in this policy is greater than zero which means that this policy subsidizes
also knowledge licensing. It does so in order to motivate R&D in the high-tech industry
and alleviate the negative effect of continuous entry on innovation incentives of high-
tech firms.
Continuous entry, in turn, can be guaranteed with lump-sum transfers to high-tech
firms (86) which make the profits of these firms marginally greater than zero for any
N .
4 Conclusions
The model presented in this paper incorporates knowledge (patent) licensing into a
stylized endogenous growth framework, where the engine of growth is high-tech firms’
in-house R&D. The inference from this model suggests that if there is knowledge li-
censing high-tech firms innovate more and economic growth is higher than in cases
when there are knowledge spillovers and/or there is no knowledge exchange among
these firms. The results also suggest that innovation in the high-tech industry and
economic growth increase with the intensity and toughness of competition in that in-
dustry. Such an inference holds also for the number of high-tech firms if there is an
exchange of knowledge among these firms in the form of licensing or spillovers. Increas-
ing the number of high-tech firms increases innovation in the high-tech industry and
the growth rate of the economy. However, if there is no exchange of knowledge among
high-tech firms, then increasing the number of firms can also discourage innovation in
the high-tech industry and reduce economic growth.
Innovation in the high-tech industry declines with the magnitude of externalities
which stem from the use of high-tech goods. However, the rate of economic growth
increases with it. Further, the existence of such externalities creates a wedge between
resource allocations in decentralized equilibrium and socially optimal allocations. In
this model, this implies that the existence of externalities also creates a wedge between
growth rates in decentralized equilibrium and the socially optimal growth rate.
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If entry (or exit) is endogenous and entails no costs, innovation in the high-tech
industry and economic growth are again higher in case when there is knowledge li-
censing. However, this happens at the expense of lower number of high-tech firms.
More intensive and/or tougher competition reduce the number of high-tech firms. If
there is an exchange of knowledge among these firms the intensity and toughness of
competition do not affect, however, allocations, innovation in the high-tech industry,
and economic growth. In contrast, allocations change and innovation and economic
growth tend to increase with the intensity and toughness of competition if there is no
exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms.
If entry entails no costs a policy consisting of four instruments can be sufficient
for achieving the first best outcome in decentralized equilibrium. The policy gives the
bargaining power in the market for knowledge to the licensors so that they appropriate
all the benefit. Further, it subsidizes the purchases of high-tech goods so that it
offsets the negative effect of price setting by high-tech firms and takes into account
the externalities from the use of high-tech goods. Finally, it subsidizes entry into the
high-tech industry and uses lump-sum taxes to cover all these subsidies.
Meanwhile, if entry entails endogenous costs then in the social optimum there is
continuous entry into the high-tech industry. In decentralized equilibrium continuous
entry erodes the returns on innovation and therefore reduces R&D effort of high-tech
firms. In order to alleviate this effect and achieve first best outcomes in decentralized
equilibrium the policy also subsidizes knowledge licensing.
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Appendix
Proofs Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The growth rates of quantities and prices that characterize
the essential dynamics of this model can be obtained from (3)-(9), (11), (19), and (20).
These growth rates are
gC =
1
θ
(r − ρ) , (95)
gY = (σ + µ) gX + (1− σ) gLY , (96)
gX =
ε
ε− 1gN + gx, (97)
gY = gw + gLY , (98)
gx = gλ + gLx , (99)
gw = gqλ + gN + gλ. (100)
Combining (31) with (19), (20), (30), (32), (36), (37), (40), and (95)-(100) gives a
differential equation in Lr,
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1] (101)
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
]
ξINS.1−2Lr −
(
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
)}
,
for all S.1-3 cases.
Let parameter restriction (41) hold. The first term of the differential equation
(101) is non-negative. Without that term, the characteristic root of the differential
equation is positive, ∂L˙r
∂Lr
> 0. This, together with neoclassical production function
of final goods (4), implies that there is a unique Lr such that (101) is stable and
NLr, NLx, LY ∈ (0, L),
LNEr =
1
ξINS.1−2
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
. (102)
Combining this expression with the relations between NLx and LY (32) and NLx
and NLr (37) gives the equilibrium allocations of labor force (42)-(44). Given that
allocations of labor force are constant from (40), (96), and (99) it follows that
gNEC = g
NE
Y = g
NE
w = (σ + µ) g
NE
X ,
gNEX = g
NE
x = g
NE
λ ,
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where gλ is given by (30),
gNEλ =
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
.
Therefore, in decentralized equilibrium with no entry if (41) holds the economy
makes a discrete ”jump” to balanced growth path in all S.1-3 cases.
Proof of Proposition 2: The value of a high-tech firm if high-tech firms innovate
[i.e., NLr ∈ (0, L)] is
V NLr∈(0,L) =
1
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) gλ + ρpi (t) exp [− (σ + µ) gλt] ,
where I have dropped the superscript NE and pi (t) can be derived from (4), (5), (7),
(9), (11), (18), (19), (42) and (43),
pi (t) =
1
N
σ
(
N
1
ε−1λ (0)NLx
)σ+µ
L1−σY
1
ek
exp [(σ + µ) gλt]
×
1− ek − 1Dk ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
ξ
INS.1−2
N
L+ ρ
 .
In turn, if none of the high-tech firms innovates then the economy is static (gY =
gλ = 0) and each high-tech firm’s profits and value are given by
pi =
1
N
σ
(
N
ε
ε−1λ (0)Lx
)σ+µ
L1−σY
1
ek
,
V NLr=0 =
1
N
σ
(
N
ε
ε−1λ (0)Lx
)σ+µ
L1−σY
1
ek
1
ρ
.
It can be easily shown that
V NLr∈(0,L) < V NLr=0,
which means that the value of any high-tech firm is higher if none of the high-tech
firms engages in R&D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Using (54), the expression for the returns on knowledge
accumulation (56) can be rewritten as
gqλ = ρ−
(
1− σ
1 + µ
ξINS.1−2Lr + ξD
SP I
N
S.1−2
N
L
)
. (103)
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Meanwhile, from (51)-(54) and (57) it follows that
gLx = gLY = −
NL˙r
L−NLr , (104)
gC = (σ + µ) (gλ + gLx) + (1− σ) gLx , (105)
gλ = ξI
N
S.1−2Lr, (106)
gqλ = −gλ − gLx − (θ − 1) gC . (107)
Combining (103)-(107) gives a differential equation in Lr,
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1] (108)
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP ] ξINS.1−2Lr − (ξDSP INS.1−2N L− ρ
)}
.
Without the first non-negative term this expression implies that ∂L˙r
∂Lr
> 0. Therefore,
there is unique Lr such that (108) is stable and NLr ∈ (0, L),
LNE,SPr =
1
ξINS.1−2
ξDSP
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP . (109)
The numerator in (109) is positive if (58) is positive.
Combining (109) with (53) and (57) gives the socially optimal (interior) allocations
of labor force (59)-(61).
Given that labor force allocations are constant from (39) and (105) it follows that
gNE,SPY = (σ + µ) g
NE,SP
λ ,
where gNE,SPλ can be derived from (52) and (109),
gNE,SPλ =
ξDSP
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP .
Therefore, the Social Planner chooses allocations such that the economy, where there
is ”no entry”, makes a discrete jump to balanced growth path.
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Proof of Proposition 4: Lifetime utility of the representative household in case
when the Social Planner innovates is
UNE,SP,NLr∈(0,L) ≡ U = 1
1− θ
1
(σ + µ) (θ − 1) gNE,SPλ + ρ
×[(
N
1
ε−1λ (0)NLNE,SPx
)σ+µ (
LNE,SPY
)1−σ]1−θ
− 1
ρ
1
1− θ .
where NLNE,SPx , L
NE,SP
Y , and g
NE,SP
λ are given by (60), (61), and (63). In turn, in case
when the Social Planner does not innovate it is
UNE,SP,NLr=0 ≡ U = 1
1− θ
1
ρ
[(
N
1
ε−1λ (0)NLNE,SPx
)σ+µ (
LNE,SPY
)1−σ]1−θ
− 1
ρ
1
1− θ .
where NLNE,SPx and L
NE,SP
Y are given by (65) and (66).
Using (60), (61), (63), (65) and (66) it can be shown that the inequality
UNE,SP,NLr=0 ≤ UNE,SP,NLr∈(0,L)
is equivalent to
(
ξDSP
INS.1−2
N
L
1
ρ
)(θ−1)(1+µ)
≤
(θ − 1) (1 + µ) ξDSP INS.1−2N L1ρ + 1
(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1
(θ−1)(1+µ)+1 .
Denote
z = ξDSP
INS.1−2
N
L
1
ρ
and take the natural logarithm of both sides of this inequality:
0 ≤ [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1] [ln ((θ − 1) (1 + µ) z + 1)− ln ((θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1)]
− (θ − 1) (1 + µ) ln z.
The derivative of the left-hand side of this inequality with respect to z is greater
than zero. Meanwhile, the left-hand side is equal to zero in case when z = 1. Therefore,
given that (58) holds z > 1 and
UNE,SP,NLr=0 ≤ UNE,SP,NLr∈(0,L).
Proof of Proposition 14: It is straightforward to show that if the number of firms
N is fixed the economy is on a balanced growth path. Further, it is straightforward
to show that p¯i in (68) declines with N (see also proposition 29). This, together with
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cost-free entry and that p¯i in (68) is constant on balanced growth path, implies that at
time zero (t = 0) N makes a discrete jump to the balanced growth path equilibrium
level where p¯i = 0. Therefore, thereafter in decentralized equilibrium with cost-free
entry the economy is always on a balanced growth path.
Proof of Proposition 18: If (74) and the remaining optimal rules/constraints are
binding, then for the case when there is no exchange of knowledge (INS.1−2 = 1) it is
straightforward to show that the optimal labor force allocations are
NLCFE,SP,S.3r =
σ + µ
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)L, (110)
NLCFE,SP,S.3x =
(ε− 1) (σ + µ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)L, (111)
LCFE,SP,S.3Y =
(ε− 1) (1− σ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)L. (112)
It can be further shown that the returns on knowledge accumulation are given by
gqλ = ρ− ξ
INS.1−2
N
ε (σ + µ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)L. (113)
In turn, from (51), (52), (74) and (110)-(112) it follows that
gLY = gNLx = gNLr = 0, (114)
gC = (σ + µ)
(
1
ε− 1gN + gλ
)
, (115)
gλ = ξLr, (116)
gqλ = −gλ − (θ − 1) gC + gN . (117)
Combining these conditions with (113) gives a differential equation in N ,
gN = − ε− 1
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
×
[
ξ (σ + µ)
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ) L
1
N
− ρ
]
.
Since ∂gN
∂N
> 0 the only stable solution is (75),
N =
ξ (σ + µ)
ρ
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ) L,
which implies that
gN = 0.
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Therefore, from (52) and (110) it follows that (76) holds,
gCFE,SP,S.3λ =
ρ
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ) .
This implies that the economy needs to make a discrete jump to balanced growth path
at time zero.
Proof of Proposition 19: In order to check whether (74) is binding denote
U¯CFE,SP,S.3,N<+∞ = UCFE,SP,S.3,N<+∞ +
1
1− θ
1
ρ
.
From (51) it follows that
U¯CFE,SP,S.3,N<+∞ =
1
1− θ
1
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) gSPλ + ρ
×
[(
N
1
ε−1λ (0)NLx
)σ+µ
L1−σY
]1−θ
,
where N , gSPλ , NLx, and LY are given by (75), (76), (111), and (112) correspondingly.
In case when θ > 1
U¯CFE,SP,S.3,N=+∞ = 0,
whereas
U¯CFE,SP,S.3,N<+∞ ≤ 0.
Meanwhile, in case when θ = 1
U¯CFE,SP,S.3,N=+∞ = +∞,
whereas
U¯CFE,SP,S.3,N<+∞ < +∞.
Clearly, therefore,
U¯CFE,SP,S.3,N=+∞ > U¯CFE,SP,S.3,N<+∞,
implying that the solution with finite N is not optimal.
Therefore, in case when there is no exchange of knowledge (INS.1−2 = 1) the Social
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Planner sets
N = +∞,
gCFE,SP,S.3λ = NL
CFE,SP,S.3
r = 0,
NLCFE,SP,S.3x = D
SPL,
LCFE,SP,S.3Y =
1− σ
σ + µ
DSPL,
and the economy is static.
Proof of Proposition 20: If there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech
firms, the expression for perceived elasticity of substitution ek (71) indicates that ek
does not depend on the type of competition. Since for any given number of firms the
perceived elasticity of substitution is higher under Bertrand competition (eBR > eCR),
from (71) it follows that in equilibrium there are fewer high-tech firms under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition. Further, given that perceived elasticities
of substitution monotonically increase with the number of firms and actual elasticity
of substitution, from (71) it follows that the number of firms under both types of
competition declines with ε and increases with µ. It also increases with α if there are
knowledge spillovers (S.2) and does not depend on α if there is knowledge licensing
(S.1).
If there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms the right-hand side of
(72) and perceived elasticity of substitution ek from (34) and (35) are increasing in N
and eBR > eCR for any N . Therefore, also in this case there are more firms under
Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition.34 Moreover, the number of
firms N declines with ε and increases with µ and α.
Proof of Proposition 21: In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among
high-tech firms
∂
∂α
gλ =
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) ξL ∂
∂α
D + αI1S.2−3ξL
∂
∂α
D − (ξDL− ρ) + ρ ∂
∂α
D[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +D
]2 ,
∂
∂µ
gλ =
ξL
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
∂
∂µ
D − (θ − 1) (ξDL− ρ) + ρ ∂
∂µ
D[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +D
]2 .
34It can be shown also that the quadratic polynomial in (72) opens upward and under Bertrand com-
petition for any N it is lower than under Cournot competition. Since stable equilibrium corresponds
to the smaller roots of the polynomials, the number of firms is lower under Bertrand competition.
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Therefore the sign of ∂
∂α
gλ is equivalent to the sign of
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) ξL ∂
∂α
D + αI1S.2−3ξL
∂
∂α
D − (ξDL− ρ) + ρ ∂
∂α
D, (118)
where
D =
σ
{
ξσL
[
αI1S.2−3 + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
]
+ ρ
}
ξσL
[
1− σ + αI1S.2−3 + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
]
+ σρ
,
∂
∂α
D =
ξσL (1− σ)σ (ξσL− ρ){
ξσL
[
1− σ + αI1S.2−3 + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
]
+ σρ
}2 .
Using these expressions and manipulating (118) gives the following expression
ξσL (1− σ)− {ξσL [1− σ + α + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)] + σρ}
which has a negative value. This implies that gλ and NLr decline with α. Moreover,
since NLx = D (L−NLr) and ∂∂αD > 0 this implies that NLx increases with α.
In turn, the sign of ∂
∂µ
gλ is equivalent to the sign of
ξL
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
] ∂
∂µ
D − (θ − 1) (ξDL− ρ) + ρ ∂
∂µ
D, (119)
where
∂
∂µ
D =
ξσL (1− σ)σ (ξσL− ρ) (θ − 1)
{ξσL [1− σ + α + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)] + σρ}2 .
Using this expression and manipulating (119) gives the following expression
ξσσL (1− σ)− {ξσL [1− σ + α + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)] + σρ}
which has a negative value. This implies that gλ and NLr decline with µ. Moreover,
since NLx = D (L−NLr) and ∂∂µD > 0 this implies that NLx increases with µ. In
contrast,
∂
∂µ
gY =
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) (σ + µ) ξL ∂
∂µ
D + αI1S.2−3
[
(ξDL− ρ) + (σ + µ) ξL ∂
∂µ
D
]
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +D
]2
+
D (ξDL− ρ) + (σ + µ) ρ ∂
∂µ
D[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +D
]2
which is positive.
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Proof of Proposition 23: Let the marginal tax rates be constant. This implies that
(95)-(100) hold. Combining (82), (83), and (95)-(100) gives the counterpart of (101),
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1]
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DGO − αN − 1
N
τλ
1− τλ
]
ξNLr −
(
ξDGOL− ρ)} .
The stationary solution of this differential equation is given by
Lr =
1
ξN
ξDGOL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DGO − αN−1
N
τλ
1−τλ
.
Remaining labor force allocations can be derived from (81) and (83).
Proof of Corollary 24: Subsidy/tax rate τpi can be derived from zero profit condi-
tion
pi = 0⇔ τpi = Lr
Lx
− 1
ε− 1 .
where
Lr
Lx
=
LSPr
LSPx
=
ξDSPL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) ξDSPL+DSPρ.
Proof of Corollary 25: To prove that p¯i is monotonically decreasing in N consider
its first term. It can be shown that
∂ek
∂N
> 0 k = CR,BR.
This implies that the first term is monotonically decreasing function of N . For the
second term,
∂
∂N
gλ
r − (gw − δgN) =
NLx
LY
(
∂
∂N
NLr
LY
)
− NLr
LY
(
∂
∂N
NLx
LY
)
(
NLx
LY
)2 ,
where
∂
∂N
NLr
LY
=
1
b
(
NLr + LY
LY
)
∂b
∂N
,
∂
∂N
NLx
LY
=
1
b
NLx
LY
∂b
∂N
.
Therefore,
− ∂
∂N
gλ
r − (gw − δgN) = −
(
1
bk
)2
1− σ
σ
∂bk
∂N
,
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where
∂bk
∂N
> 0.
Therefore, the second term is monotonically decreasing function of the number of firms
as well. Hence, p¯i is monotonically decreasing function of N .
An alternative proof for p¯i′ < 0 uses the labor market clearing condition (36),
final and telecom goods production functions (4), (11), and the relation between labor
demand in final goods and high-tech goods production. A sufficient condition to observe
the desired is bσL1−σ
1+µ
< NLx, which can be shown to hold from the labor market
clearing condition.
Proof of Proposition 26: The growth rates and labor force allocations can be
derived from (30)-(38) and (95)-(100). In case when there is continuous entry into the
high-tech industry the growth rate of knowledge is
gCEλ =
ξDL− ρ(
θ − 1 + I0
N˙=0
)
B + αI1S.2−3 +D
, (120)
The growth rate of consumption, final output, number of firms and savings are
gCEC = g
CE
Y = g
CE
N = g
CE
S
= BgCEλ .
Proof of Proposition 27: Given that in this case N is endogenous state variable it is
convenient to rewrite labor force allocations to knowledge accumulation and production
of high-tech goods as
L¯r = NLr,
L¯x = NLx.
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The hypothetical Social Planner’s then solves:
max
S,L¯x,L¯r
U =
+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt.
s.t.
Y = C + S, (121)
Y =
(
N
1
ε−1λL¯x
)σ+µ (
L− L¯x − L¯r
)1−σ
, (122)
λ˙ = ξλL¯r, (123)
N˙ = ηS, (124)
λ (0) > 0, N (0) > 1.
The Social Planner’s optimal choice for accumulation of N is given by
[N ] : q˙N = qNρ− σ + µ
ε− 1 Y
1
N
C−θ. (125)
The remaining optimal rules are as follows
[
L¯x
]
: L¯x =
σ + µ
1− σLY (126)[
L¯r
]
: qλξλ = (1− σ)C−θ Y
LY
(127)
[λ] : q˙λ = qλρ−
[
qλξL¯r + (σ + µ)C
−θY
λ
]
(128)
Since C and S are in the same terms it has to be that
C−θ = ηqN . (129)
Using expression (127) and labor market clearing condition (36) the returns on
knowledge accumulation (128) can be rewritten as
gqλ = ρ−
(
1− σ
1 + µ
ξL¯r +
σ + µ
1 + µ
ξL
)
. (130)
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In turn, from (36) and (122)-(127) it follows that
gY = (σ + µ)
(
1
ε− 1gN + gλ + gL¯x
)
+ (1− σ) gLY , (131)
gλ = ξL¯r, (132)
gN = η
S
N
,
gL¯x = gLY = −
∂L¯r
∂t
1
L− L¯r ,
gqλ = −θgC + gY − gLY − gλ. (133)
From these expressions and (125) it is possible to derive a differential equation in
LY ,
gLY = −
σ + µ
µ
ξL+ ξ
σ + µ
1− σLY +
σ + µ
(ε− 1)µη
C
N
. (134)
Since growth rate of LY increases with LY the only stationary solution of this equation
is gLY = 0. This implies that labor force allocations are constant in the social optimum
gL¯r = gL¯x = gLY = 0.
Moreover, (134) implies a relation between N and λ on balanced growth path and
gC = gN .
These results, together with (121)-(125) and (128), imply that
gN = const
and
gN = gS = gC = gY .
From (131), (132), (133) and labor market clearing condition (36) then it follows
that
gCE,SPY = B
SPgCE,SPλ ,
gCE,SPλ =
ξDSPL− ρ
(θ − 1)BSP +DSP ,
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and
NLCE,SPr =
1
ξ
ξDSPL− ρ
(θ − 1)BSP +DSP , (135)
NLCE,SPx = D
SP 1
ξ
ξ (θ − 1)BSPL+ ρ
(θ − 1)BSP +DSP , (136)
LCE,SPY =
1− σ
σ + µ
DSP
1
ξ
ξ (θ − 1)BSPL+ ρ
(θ − 1)BSP +DSP . (137)
It can be shown that as long as there can be negative investments in N and η is
sufficiently low in the social optimum the economy makes a discrete jump to balanced
growth path at time zero (t = 0). This holds because when the economy is relatively
abundant of N [(137) does not hold] then the Social Planner at time zero selects
negative investments in N so that (137) holds from the following instance. Meanwhile,
sufficiently low η guarantees that balanced growth path value of N is so low that when
the economy is relatively abundant of λ there are sufficient resources for savings that
(immediately) cover the gap between initial and balanced growth path value of N . The
Social Planner in such a case also selects savings so that the economy makes a discrete
jump to balanced growth path.
Proof of Corollary 29: Let N˙ > 0 and
τx =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
so that DGO and DSP are equivalent. Combining equations (95)-(100) with (82) and
(83) gives the counterpart of (101),
NL˙r =
L−NLr
θB 1+µ
σ+µ
+ 1
[(
θB +DSP − αN − 1
N
τλ
1− τλ
)
ξNLr −
(
ξDSPL− ρ)] .
If
α
N − 1
N
τλ
1− τλ = B,
or equivalently
τλ =
N
N−1
1
α
B
1 + N
N−1
1
α
B
,
then labor force allocations and growth rates in decentralized equilibrium coincide with
the choices of the Social Planner.
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Appendix E.1
In this section I present a setup where high-tech firms cooperate in R&D and select
optimal rules for R&D so that to maximize joint profits. High-tech firms later compete
in the product market. I call this case CO - R&D cooperation.35
I offer below the setup of the high-tech industry and the optimization problem of
high-tech firms in the stage of R&D cooperation.
R&D Cooperation: Each high-tech firm has its knowledge. At R&D cooperation
stage high-tech firms establish a research joint venture where they pool their knowl-
edge and jointly hire researchers. In a ”laboratory” a group of researchers combines
the knowledge of different firms in order to produce a better one for a firm. There are
as many laboratories (or different knowledge production processes) as many there are
high-tech firms. This research joint venture takes into account the effect of the accu-
mulation of one type of knowledge on the accumulation of other types of knowledge.36
In such a case high-tech firms take (19) as given and jointly solve the following
optimal problem.
max
NLr
+∞∫
t¯

N(t)∑
j=1
pij (t) exp
[
−
t∫¯
t
r (s) ds
] dt
s.t.
N∑
j=1
pij =
N∑
j=1
(
pxjλj − w
)
Lxj − wNLr, (138)
xj = λjLxj , (139)
λ˙j = ξ
(
N∑
i=1
λαi
)
λ1−αj Lrj . (140)
The optimal rules for R&D that follow from this problem are
[
Lrj
]
: w = qλj
λ˙j
Lrj
, (141)
[λj] :
q˙λj
qλj
= r −
(
N∑
j=1
ekj − 1
ekj
pxj
qλj
Lxj +
∂λ˙j
∂λj
)
, (142)
35It might be argued that firms’ cooperation in R&D increases the odds that they will collude in the
product market. I rule this out in order to focus on the differences between knowledge exchange
mechanisms.
36An alternative cooperation mode is that high-tech firms in R&D stage jointly hire researchers and
produce the same knowledge for all. In such a case the knowledge accumulation process is λ˙ = ξλNLr.
It can be easily shown that the decentralized equilibrium outcome of this cooperation mode is no
different than the outcome of the cooperation mode offered in this section.
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where
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξLrj (143)
×
{
1 + (1− α)
(
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
λi
λj
)α
+ α
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(
λi
λj
)−(1−α)
∂λi
∂λj
]}
,
and
∂λi
∂λj
=
∂λi
∂t
∂t
∂λj
=
(
λi
λj
)1−α
Lri
Lrj
. (144)
The third term in the second line of (143) illustrates effect of the accumulation of
the jth type of knowledge (the knowledge of high-tech firm j) on the accumulation of
remaining types of knowledge.
In symmetric equilibrium, according to (140) the growth rate of knowledge is
gλ = ξNLr. (145)
The rate of return on knowledge accumulation can be derived from (19), (141)-
(144). It is the same as (31) where I1S.2−3 = 0,
gqλ = r − gλ
(
Lx
Lr
+ 1
)
.
The growth rates of quantities and prices that characterize the essential dynamics
of this model if there is R&D cooperation are given by (95)-(99) and
gw = gqλ + gλ. (146)
This equation is the counterpart of (100).
From high-tech firm’s demand for labor for production (19), final goods producer’s
optimal rules (6)-(7), and the relation between PXX and pxx (9) follows a relationship
between NLx and LY (32). This relationship together with labor market clearing
condition (36), implies a relationship between NLx and NLr (37).
Meanwhile, in the final goods market (39) holds
Y = C.
Combining (31) with (19), (32), (36), (37), (95)-(99), (141), (145), and (146) gives
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a differential equation in Lr,
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1] (147)
× {[(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk] ξNLr − (ξDkL− ρ)} ,
which is the counterpart of (101).
Let θ ≥ 1 and (41) hold. Therefore, given that the first term of this differential equa-
tion is non-negative there is unique Lr such that (147) is stable and NLr, NLx, LY ∈
(0, L),
Lr =
1
ξN
ξDkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk .
Combining this expression with the relations between NLx and LY (32) and NLx
and NLr (37) and (145) gives the equilibrium allocations of labor force and growth
rates of final output and knowledge
NLNEr =
1
ξ
ξDkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk ,
NLNEx = D
k
(θ − 1) (σ + µ)L+ 1
ξ
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk ,
LNEY =
1− σ
σbk
Dk
[(θ − 1) (σ + µ)]L+ 1
ξ
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk ,
gNEY = (σ + µ) g
NE
λ ,
gNEλ =
ξDkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk .
Therefore, in decentralized equilibrium with no entry and R&D collaboration if (41)
holds the economy makes a discrete jump to balanced growth path. Further, the
growth rates and labor force allocations are the same in cases when there is knowledge
licensing (S.1) and R&D collaboration (CO). This means that if there is no (contin-
uous) entry knowledge licensing and R&D cooperation deliver equivalent equilibrium
outcomes. Therefore, the policy (84)-(85) also leads to the first best outcome in terms
of allocations and growth rates in this case.
Further, in line with the results offered in the section where I discuss policies in
order to have socially optimal number of high-tech firms there need to be lump-sum
transfers to high-tech firms given by (86). These transfers make sure profits are greater
than zero for any finite N and are zero for N = +∞.
When there is continuous entry into the high-tech industry equations (100) and
(146) identify the difference between R&D cooperation (CO) and knowledge licensing
(S.1). The rate of return on knowledge accumulation in case when there is knowledge
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licensing declines with continuous entry of firms (N˙ > 0). In contrast, in case when
there is R&D cooperation it does not do so. This is because in R&D cooperation
case firms choose R&D expenditures to maximize joint profits. Meanwhile, in case
when there is knowledge licensing entry erodes the profits and returns on knowledge
accumulation of high-tech firms.
It can be easily shown that when there is continuous entry and R&D cooperation
the growth rate of knowledge/productivity is
gCEλ =
ξDL− ρ
(θ − 1) (ε−1)(σ+µ)
ε−1−(σ+µ) +D
. (148)
This implies that, the policy (84)-(85) leads to the first best outcome in terms of
allocations and growth rates in this case.
Comparing (120) and (148) it is straightforward to notice that
gCEλ > g
CE,S.1−2
λ .
This is because continuous entry (N˙ > 0) into high-tech industry decreases the returns
on knowledge accumulation if high-tech firms engage in R&D disjointly.
Appendix E.2
In this section I show that adding knowledge depreciation and spillovers in case when
there is knowledge licensing does not alter the main results. I consider exclusively S.1
and S.3 cases and the decentralized equilibrium of the model. I further assume that
there are exogenous barriers to entry into the high-tech industry.
In order to support symmetric equilibrium I assume that the rate of depreciation of
knowledge is the same across high-tech firms, δ (> 0). This implies that the knowledge
accumulation processes in case when there are is no knowledge exchange among high-
tech firms (S.3) can be written as
λ˙j = ξλ˜λ
1−α
j Lrj − δλj. (149)
Meanwhile, adding spillovers in the knowledge accumulation process in case there
is knowledge licensing results in
λ˙j = ξ
[
N∑
i=1
λˆi (ui,jλi)
α1
]
λα2j Lrj − δλj, (150)
α1 + α2 > 1− α,
62
where I assume that in equilibrium
λˆi ≡ (ui,jλi)1−α1−α2 .
The optimal problem of high-tech firm j in such a case is
max
Cournot: Lxj ,Lrj ,{uj,i,ui,j}Ni=1;(i 6=j)
Bertrand: pxj ,Lrj ,{uj,i,ui,j}Ni=1;(i 6=j)
Vj (t¯) =
+∞∫
t¯
pij (t) exp
[
−
t∫¯
t
r (s) ds
]
dt
s.t.
pij = pxjxj − w
(
Lxj + Lrj
)
+
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλj (uj,iλj)−
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
pui,jλi (ui,jλi)
]
,
(8), (11), (149) or (150).
The demand functions for labor force for production and R&D are then given by
[
Lxj
]
: w = λjpxj
(
1− 1
ekj
)
, (151)
[
Lrj
]
: w = qλj
∂λ˙j
∂Lrj
. (152)
In case when there is knowledge licensing (and spillovers; S.1) the returns on knowledge
accumulation are
[λj] :
q˙λj
qλj
= r −
(
ekj − 1
ekj
pxj
qλj
Lxj +
∂λ˙j
∂λj
+
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλjuj,i
qλj
)
,
where
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξλα2−1j Lrj
[
α2
N∑
i=1
λˆi (ui,jλi)
α1 + α1λˆjλ
α1
j
]
− δ,
and the supply of and demand for knowledge are
[uj,i] : uj,i = 1, ∀i 6= j,
[ui,j] : pui,jλi = qλjξα1λˆi (ui,jλi)
α1−1 λα2j Lrj , ∀i 6= j.
Meanwhile, in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms
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(S.3) the returns on knowledge accumulation are
[λj] :
q˙λj
qλj
= r −
[
ekj − 1
ekj
pxj
qλj
Lxj + (1− α) ξλ˜λ−αj Lrj − δ
]
.
In a symmetric equilibrium, in cases when there is knowledge licensing (S.1) and no
exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms (S.3) returns on knowledge accumulation
can be rewritten as
gqλ = r + δ − (gλ + δ)
(
Lx
Lr
+ I1−αS.3
)
, (153)
where
I1−αS.3 =
{
α1 + α2 for S.1,
1− α for S.3.
Using (37), (95)-(100), (151) and (152) this expression can be rewritten as a differ-
ential equation in Lr,
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1]×([
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + 1− I1−αS.3
]
ξINS.1−2Lr−{
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L+
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk] δ − ρ}) ,
Let
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L− (1− IS) δ − ρ > 0.
This differential equation is stable if
Lr =
1
ξINS.1−2
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L+
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk] δ − ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + 1− I1−αS.3
.
This implies that the economy immediately jumps to balanced growth path where
labor force allocations and growth rates of final output and knowledge are
NLr =
N
ξINS.1−2
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L+
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk] δ − ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + 1− I1−αS.3
,
NLx = D
k (L−NLr) ,
LY =
1− σ
σbk
NLx,
gY = (σ + µ) gλ,
gλ =
ξDk
INS.1−2
N
L− (1− I1−αS.3 ) δ − ρ
(θ − 1) (µ+ σ) +Dk + 1− I1−αS.3
.
64
Therefore,
∂gλ
∂δ
< 0,
∂NLr
∂δ
> 0,
∂NLx
∂δ
< 0,
∂LY
∂δ
< 0,
and
∂gλ
∂I1−αS.3
> 0,
∂NLr
∂I1−αS.3
> 0,
∂NLx
∂I1−αS.3
< 0,
∂LY
∂I1−αS.3
< 0. (154)
Relationships (154) imply that the growth rate of productivity and labor force allo-
cation to productivity/knowledge accumulation are decreasing with the degree of not
appropriated returns on knowledge accumulation. Meanwhile, NLx and LY are in-
creasing with it. This is analogous to the results in section Entry Regime 1.
Appendix E.3
In this section I relax the assumption that there are externalities within high-tech
firms in two ways and present the main properties of the model. First I assume that
there are decreasing returns to knowledge accumulation at firm-level unless there is
an exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms. Next, I assume instead that there
no externalities in high-tech firms and, as in the main text, returns on knowledge
accumulation are constant even if there is no exchange of knowledge.
I have assumed that N is a real number. If N also changes continuously then in the
sums in (12) and (13) each firm has zero size. Since λ of each firm is finite dropping firm
j or any finite number of firms from those sums makes no difference for the inference.
If N changes discretely (and each firm has unit size) I assume that N − 1 > 1 so
that knowledge exchange can only increase the productivity of researchers. In such a
circumstance I assume that if there is knowledge licensing the knowledge accumulation
process of high-tech firm j is given by
λ˙j = ξ
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(ui,jλi)
α
]
λ1−αj Lrj . (155)
This is the counterpart of (12) where uj,j ≡ 0. In turn, if there are knowledge spillovers
the knowledge accumulation process is given by (13) where
Λ˜ ≡
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
λαi . (156)
If there is no knowledge exchange among high-tech firms I assume that knowledge
accumulation process is given by (15) where
λ˜ ≡ 1. (157)
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Therefore, the counterparts of (24), (28), and (29) are given by
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξ (1− α)
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(
ui,jλi
λj
)α]
Lrj , (158)
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξ (1− α)
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(
ui,jλi
λj
)α]
Lrj , (159)
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξ (1− α)λ−αj Lrj . (160)
I further focus on symmetric equilibrium analysis in the high-tech industry. For the
subsequent analysis it is useful to define function IN−1S.1−2 as
IN−1S.1−2 =
{
λ−α for S.3,
N − 1 otherwise.
In such a case the growth rate of knowledge in the high-tech industry in all setups
(S.1-3) can be rewritten as
gλ = ξI
N−1
S.1−2Lr. (161)
The (internal) rate of return on knowledge accumulation can be obtained from the
optimal rules of the high-tech firm (19), (20), and (23), (27), (158)-(160). It is given
by (31),
gqλ = r − gλ
(
Lx
Lr
+ 1− αI1S.2−3
)
,
where
gλ = ξI
N−1
S.1−2Lr.
Combining (31) with (19), (20), (32), (36), (37), (40), (95)-(100) and (161) gives
the counterpart of (101),
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1] (162)
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
]
ξ
IN−1S.1−2
N
NLr −
(
ξDk
IN−1S.1−2
N
L− ρ
)}
.
Assuming that
ξDk
N − 1
N
L− ρ > 0,
if there is exchange of knowledge the stable solution of this differential equation is
NLr =
1
ξ
ξDkL− N
N−1ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
.
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Therefore, gλ is given by
gλ =
ξDk N−1
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
.
This implies that the comparative statics with respect to σ, µ, α, ε, and type of
competition presented in the section Entry Regime 1 hold. Moreover, gλ increases
with N and at least for sufficiently high N (N > 2) it is concave in N .
Meanwhile, in case there is no exchange of knowledge the expression (162) is sec-
ond order differential equation in knowledge λ. It describes the path of λ. In the
steady-state the growth rate of knowledge and labor force allocation to knowledge ac-
cumulation are zero. Therefore, labor force allocations to high-tech and final goods
production are given by (48) and (49).
If there are no knowledge externalities within high-tech firms
In this section I assume that everything else the same in case when there are knowledge
spillovers among high-tech firms the knowledge accumulation process is given by
λ˙j = ξ
[
λj + Λ˜λ
1−α
j
]
Lrj , (163)
where I assume that in equilibrium Λ˜ is given by (156). Meanwhile, in case when
there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms I assume that the knowledge
accumulation process is given by
λ˙j = ξλjLrj . (164)
From (163) it follows that (28) needs to be rewritten as
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξ
[
1 + (1− α)
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(
λi
λj
)α]
Lrj . (165)
In turn, from (164) it follows that (29) needs to be rewritten as
∂λ˙j
∂λj
= ξ (1− α)Lrj . (166)
The (internal) rate of return on knowledge accumulation can be derived from the
optimal rules of the high-tech firm (19), (20), and (23), (27), (163), (164), (165), and
67
(166). In a symmetric equilibrium, in case there are knowledge spillovers it is given by
gqλ = r − gλ
[
Lx
Lr
+
1 + (1− α) (N − 1)
N
]
, (167)
and in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech firms it is given
by (31) where I1S.2−3 = 0,
gqλ = r − gλ
(
Lx
Lr
+ 1
)
. (168)
From (168) it follows that if the knowledge accumulation process is given by (164)
then the growth rate of knowledge and labor force allocations are given by (42)-(46)
where I1S.2−3 = 0 and I
N
S.1−2 = 1. Therefore, the comparative statics with respect to
σ, µ, ε, N and type of competition presented in the section Entry Regime 1 hold.
Meanwhile, gλ does not depend on α.
Further, combining (167) with (19), (20), (30), (32), (36), (37), (40), and (95)-(100)
gives the counterpart of (101),
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1]×{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + αN − 1
N
]
ξNLr −
(
ξDkL− ρ)} .
Therefore, the stable solution of this differential equation is
NLr =
1
ξ
ξDkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + αN−1
N
.
This implies that the growth rate of knowledge is given by
gS.2,NExλ =
ξDkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + αN−1
N
.
Therefore, the comparative statics with respect to σ, µ, α, ε, and type of competition
presented in the section Entry regime 1 hold.
If N changes continuously then N−1
N
can be replaced by 1 and gS.2,NExλ is increasing
and concave in N . Meanwhile, in case when N changes discretely gS.2,NExλ is increasing
and concave in N if parameters θ, ρ (and σ and µ) are sufficiently high and N is
sufficiently small. However, if θ and ρ are low (e.g., θ = 1, ρ = 0) or N is high then
gS.2,NExλ is decreasing and convex in N . It can be further shown that
gS.1λ > g
S.2,NEx
λ > g
S.2
λ ,
lim
N→+∞
gS.2,NExλ = lim
N→+∞
gS.2λ .
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Appendix E.4
In this section I present the main properties of the model if high-tech firms take into
account the effect of knowledge accumulation on the price of knowledge puj,iλj . Further,
I offer a policy that if implemented in decentralized equilibrium leads to socially optimal
outcomes.37
The high-tech firms in this case internalize the demand (23). Therefore, the profit
function of high-tech firm j ”at the stage” when it designs its supply of knowledge and
knowledge accumulation is
pij = pxjxj − w
(
Lxj + Lrj
)
+
[
αξ
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
qλi (uj,iλj)
α λ1−αi Lri −
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
pui,jλi (ui,jλi)
]
.
This implies that everything else the same (25) needs to be rewritten as
[λj] :
q˙λj
qλj
= r −
[
ekj − 1
ekj
pxj
qλj
Lxj +
∂λ˙j
∂λj
+ α2ξ
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
qλi (uj,iλj)
α λ1−αi Lri
qλjλj
]
.
Therefore, in symmetric equilibrium the rate of return on knowledge accumulation is
gqλ = r − gλ
[
Lx
Lr
+ 1− α (1− α) N − 1
N
]
. (169)
In this expression the third term in square brackets captures the adverse effect of higher
knowledge accumulation on the price of knowledge.
Combining (95)-(100), (37), and (169) gives the counterpart of (101),
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1]
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + α (1− α) N − 1
N
]
ξNLr −
(
ξDkL− ρ)} .
37I assume that price discrimination is not feasible. This is necessary in order to avoid the problem with
determination of the price of durable goods (Coase, 1972). In this framework it can be supported,
for example, by an assumption that the licensors have to license their entire knowledge (at a uniform
price). Another assumption that could support this is that licensors rent (but not sell) their knowledge
and cannot monitor its use.
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Therefore, in equilibrium
NLNE,Mr =
1
ξ
ξDkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + α (1− α) N−1
N
,
NLNE,Mx = D
k
[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + α (1− α) N−1
N
]
L+ 1
ξ
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + α (1− α) N−1
N
,
LNE,MY =
1− σ
σbk
NLx,
gNE,Mλ = ξNL
NE,M
r ,
where I use M in order to indicate that the firms are price setters in the market for
knowledge in the sense that they internalize the effect of knowledge accumulation on
the price of knowledge. If N changes continuously then N−1
N
can be replaced by 1 in
all these expressions.
Comparing these results with (42)-(46) it is clear that for any given N
NLNE,S.1r > NL
NE,M
r > NL
NE,S.2
r ,
NLNE,S.1x < NL
NE,M
x < NL
NE,S.2
x ,
LNE,S.1Y < L
NE,M
Y < L
NE,S.2
Y ,
gNE,S.1λ > g
NE,M
λ > g
NE,S.2
λ .
Therefore, with cost-free entry assumption
gCFE,S.1λ > g
CFE,M
λ > g
CFE,S.2
λ ,
and
NCFE,S.1 < NCFE,M < NCFE,S.2.
This is because ZP is monotonically decreasing function of N .
If N changes continuously then gNE,Mλ is increasing and concave in N . It is increas-
ing and concave in N also in case N changes discretely if parameters θ, ρ (and σ and
µ) are sufficiently high and N is sufficiently small. However, if θ and ρ are low (e.g.,
θ = 1, ρ = 0) or N is high then gNE,Mλ can be decreasing and convex in N .
These results imply that if high-tech firms take into account the effect of knowledge
accumulation on the price of knowledge they innovate less. Therefore, the economy
grows at a lower rate than the economy where high-tech firms do not take into account
this effect. Moreover, since
gSPλ > g
S.1
λ
the economy (again) fails to grow at the socially optimal rate and fails to have socially
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optimal labor allocations.
A policy that can equate decentralized equilibrium allocations and growth rates
to their socially optimal counterparts subsidizes the demand for high-tech goods and
high-tech firms’ demand for knowledge. It can be shown that this policy is
τx =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
,
τλ = 1− α.
Further, in line with the results offered in the section where I discuss policies in
order to have socially optimal number of high-tech firms there need to be lump-sum
transfers to high-tech firms given by (86). These transfers make sure profits are greater
than zero for any finite N and are zero for N = +∞.
The profit function of high-tech firms can be rewritten as
pi = wLx
[
1
ek − 1 −
(
1− αN − 1
N
τλ
1− τλ
)
Lr
Lx
+ τMpi
]
, (170)
where
Lr
Lx
=
LSPr
LSPx
=
ξDSPL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) ξDSPL+DSPρ.
Therefore,
τMpi = α
Lr
Lx
− 1
ε− 1 .
This implies that unlike τpi from (87) the rate τ
M
pi can be negative, for example, if
α ≈ 0.38
Appendix E.5
In this section I present the main properties of the model in case when final goods
producers do not hire labor (σ = 1) or LY is fixed.
If σ = 1 then (4) is given by
Y = X˜X. (171)
and final goods producers’ demand for high-tech goods bundle is given by
PX = X˜. (172)
38In order to have a meaningful policy a parameter restriction is required so that τMpi which solves zero
profit condition for (170) is increasing in N .
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Assuming symmetric equilibrium this implies that (96) needs to be rewritten as
gY = (1 + µ) gX , (173)
and (98) needs to be replaced by
gqλ = µ (gλ + gLx) , (174)
which follows from (5), (10), (11), (19), (20), and (172).
Since LY = 0 the labor market clearing condition is
L = NLx +NLr. (175)
Combining (31) with (30), (40), (95), (97), (99), and (173)-(175) gives a differential
equation in Lr,
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1]
×
{[
(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
]
ξINS.1−2Lr −
(
ξ
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
)}
.
Therefore, labor force allocations and growth rates of final output and knowledge/productivity
are given by
NLr =
N
ξINS.1−2
ξ
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
,
NLx =
[
(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
L+ N
ξINS.1−2
ρ
(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
,
gY = (1 + µ) gλ,
gλ =
ξ
INS.1−2
N
L− ρ
(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
.
Given that in this case LY = 0 these expressions coincide with (42)-(46) in the limit
when σ = 1. They suggest that if σ = 1 labor force allocations and, therefore, growth
rates do not depend on competitive pressure in the high-tech industry. This is because
in this case there are no relative price distortions in the sense that all prices are affected
in a similar manner.
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In case, however, LY ≡ ζ1 > 0 then from (32) and (36) it follows that
NLx =
σ
1− σ
ek − 1
ek
ζ1,
NLr = L− e
k − σ
(1− σ) ek ζ1.
Increasing competitive pressure in the high-tech industry increases e in these ex-
pressions. Therefore, NLx increases with e, whereas NLr declines with it, which means
that increasing the competitive pressure in this case increases the output of the high-
tech industry but reduces the amount of resources devoted to innovation. This is
because increasing the competitive pressure increases NLx and since LY is fixed that
reduces NLr.
In case when the wage of researchers Lr is given wLr ≡ ζ2Z the demand for labor
for R&D of high-tech firm j is given by
wLr = qλj
λ˙j
Lrj
.
Combining this expression with (19) gives the relative demand for labor for production.
In symmetric equilibrium the relative demand is
ξINS.1−2
w
wLr
=
e− 1
e
px
qλ
.
Combining these expressions with returns on knowledge accumulation (23) and (24)-
(29) gives
gwLr = r − gλ
(
w
wLr
NLx
NLr
− αI1S.2−3
)
.
Assuming that gwLr = gw from this expression, (40), and (95)-(99) it follows then
−gLx =
1
(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
gλ + ρ− gλ w
wLr
NLx
NLr
}
.
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In turn, from (37) it follows that
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1]
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +
w
wLr
Dk
]
ξINS.1−2Lr
−
(
ξ
INS.1−2
N
w
wLr
DkL− ρ
)}
.
Therefore, labor force allocation to R&D in the high-tech industry and growth rate of
knowledge are given by
NLr =
N
ξINS.1−2
ξ
INS.1−2
N
w
wLr
DkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + wwLrDk
,
gλ =
ξ
INS.1−2
N
w
wLr
DkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + wwLrDk
.
This implies that reducing the relative wage w
wLr
reduces innovation.
Appendix E.6
In this section I show that subsidies to production of high-tech goods (τLx) and R&D
expenditures (τLr) can also lead to first best labor force allocations and growth rates.
Under such a policy the profit function of high-tech firm j is
pij = pxjxj − (1− τLx)wLxj − (1− τLr)wLrj
+
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλj (uj,iλj)−
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
pui,jλi (ui,jλi)
]
+ Tpi.
In turn, its demand for labor for the production of its high-tech good (19) and demand
for labor for R&D (20) are given by
[
Lxj
]
: (1− τLx)w = λjpxj
(
1− 1
ej
)
,
[
Lrj
]
: (1− τLr)w = qλj
λ˙j
Lrj
.
Assuming symmetric equilibrium and combining these optimal rules with (6), (7),
(24) and labor market clearing condition (36) gives the counterparts of the relation
between NLx and LY (32), returns on knowledge accumulation (31), and the relation
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between NLx and NLr.
NLx =
1
1− τLx
σ
1− σb
kLY ,
gqλ = r − gλ
(
1− τLx
1− τLr
Lx
Lr
+ 1
)
,
NLx = D
GO (L−NLr) ,
where
DGO =
[
(1− τLx)
1− σ
σ
1
bk
+ 1
]−1
.
Assuming that subsidy rates are constant and combining these conditions with
(95)-(100) gives the counterpart of (101),
L˙r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1]
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DGO 1− τLx
1− τLr
]
ξNLr
−
(
ξDGO
1− τLx
1− τLr
L− ρ
)}
.
Labor force allocations and the growth rate of knowledge gλ then are
NLr =
1
ξ
ξDGO
1−τLx
1−τLr L− ρ
(θ − 1) (µ+ σ) +DGO 1−τLx
1−τLr
,
NLx = D
GO
(θ − 1) (µ+ σ)L+ 1
ξ
ρ
(θ − 1) (µ+ σ) +DGO 1−τLx
1−τLr
,
LY = (1− τx) (1− τLx)
1− σ
σbk
NLx,
gλ = ξNLr.
Therefore, in order to have socially optimal growth rate and labor allocations it is
sufficient to have
NLr = NL
SP
r , NLx = NL
SP
x .
In order to achieve such outcomes it is sufficient to subsidize the expenditures of
high-tech firms
τLx = τLr =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
,
In this case, τLx and τLr are equal because in decentralized equilibrium the relative
price distortions affect wages of Lx and Lr in the same way.
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Appendix T.1
The elasticities of substitution between the knowledge that high-tech firm j licenses
from other firms and between its knowledge and the knowledge of other firms can be
derived from (12).
The elasticity of substitution between the knowledge licensed from firm m and firm
k (m 6= k) is given by
ελm,k =
1
1− α.
In turn, the elasticity of substitution between the knowledge bought from firm k and
firm j’s own knowledge can be derived in the following way.
ελj,k =
d ln
(
uk,jλk
λj
)
(1− α) d ln
(
uk,jλk
λj
)
+ d ln
[
(1− α)
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(
ui,jλi
λj
)α
+ 1
] .
Denote
uk,jλk
λj
= z,
and rewrite ελj,k as
ελj,k =
1
1− α + α (1−α)zα
(1−α)zα+(1−α)
N∑
i=1,i 6=j,k
(
ui,jλi
λj
)α
+1
.
Since the third term in the denominator of ελj,k is positive
ελj,k < ε
λ
m,k.
This means that the elasticity of substitution between the firm’s knowledge with the
knowledge that it licenses from other firms is lower than the elasticity of substitution
between the different types of knowledge that it licenses from other firms.
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